

"THEY THOUGHT WE'D STAY SILENT":

Survivors of Brutal Sexual Violence Fight
Impunity in Post-Coup Myanmar



RESEARCH REPORT

DECEMBER 2025

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Foreword



Following the military's return to power in the February 2021 coup d'état (coup), Myanmar Security Forces¹ – comprising units of the Myanmar Armed Forces, police, as well as members of allied militias – have subjected women, men, girls, and boys, including members of the LGBTQI+ community, to brutal acts of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Sagaing, Magway, Chin, and Kayah/Karenni States. These include crimes committed by State Administration Council (SAC) soldiers, military intelligence officers, and pro-military militias such as the Pyusawhti, with particularly notorious conduct by the so-called "Ogre Column" operating in Sagaing.

Our investigations demonstrate that post-coup offensives carried out across all four States were each characterised by incidents of rape, sexualised torture, and other sexual and gender-based crimes committed during raids, at checkpoints, and particularly across State-run and operated official and makeshift interrogation facilities. These included the five interrogation centres of Shwe Phyi Thar, Ye Kyi Ai and Nine-Mile (Yangon Region), Mandalay Royal Palace (Mandalay Region), and Mya Taung (Sagaing Region), as well as regional military command headquarters, and local police stations.

Notably, the scale and systematic nature of CRSV documented in Sagaing and Magway mark a new and deeply concerning expansion of these violations beyond ethnic minority states, and into regions that – prior to the coup – had not exhibited comparable patterns of CRSV. We note that this new pattern indicates a disturbing geographic widening of CRSV as a tactic of war and repression within Myanmar's evolving conflict landscape.

The violations we documented were carried out predominantly by men and occurred primarily outside formal detention settings – during offensive military operations and raids, and at the five identified interrogation facilities. The victims were primarily women and girls, with several cases also involving LGBTQI+ persons subjected to sexualised torture.

In the aftermath of the coup, members of non-state armed groups – comprising elements of Myanmar's armed resistance – also perpetrated CRSV. Incidents attributed to the People's Defence Forces (PDF), Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs), and specifically the Arakan Army (AA) include rape, attempted rape, and

sexual harassment, as well as cases of sexual violence preceding extrajudicial executions. These violations and crimes were recorded in northern Shan, Rakhine, Kayah, Kachin, Chin, Sagaing, and Magway – areas where opposition offensives have particularly intensified since 2024.

We found that violations by members of non-state armed groups appeared to have been opportunistic or individually driven, though several of the incidents involved targeted sexual violence against civilians (perceived to be) aligned with the Myanmar military and allied factions. While these acts were not reflective of an organised policy, they consistently revealed a persecutory intent, and, more discernibly, demonstrate a troubling trend of sexual violence within resistance-controlled or contested areas, exacerbated by the on-going collapse of the rule of law in Myanmar.

Moreover, cases of domestic and intimate partner violence have too surged throughout the post-coup period, reflecting how sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is now permeating every sphere of Myanmar’s protracted “polycrisis” encompassing the on-going armed conflict, the ensuing political collapse, and a deepening economic hardship transcending so many facets of daily life. Such acts have contributed to the overall environment across Myanmar in which sexual and gender-based violence and crimes have tragically become normalised by all sides.

This report exposes the grim reality that civilians across Myanmar are trapped in a pervasive and ever-deepening environment of CRSV and SGBV. The State bears a clear legal and moral duty to act under international human rights law, to prevent these atrocities, hold perpetrators to account, and protect survivors, whoever the perpetrators may be.

On behalf of several survivors, Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) has submitted a complaint under the principle of universal jurisdiction, focusing on instances of sexual and gender-based crimes and torture in detention and interrogation settings, among other international crimes. The submission addresses international crimes not yet covered in previous universal jurisdiction filings and specifically underscores the persecution of individuals on gender and political grounds following the 2021 coup.



Antonia Mulvey

Founder and Executive Director,
Legal Action Worldwide (LAW)

Survivors' Statement

We, members of Survivors United for Rights and Justice – SURJ, call for justice in solidarity with survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and other grave human rights violations in Myanmar.

For too long, our suffering has been ignored and our dignity denied. We speak today not only for ourselves, but also for countless others whose voices remain unheard, whose lives have been devastated, and whose future has been stolen by violence and impunity.

The violence we endured was systematic, carried out under the protection of authority and with the clear intent to silence, punish, and destroy. Many of us suffered sexual violence, torture, detention, and humiliation at the hands of the military junta and other armed forces. The trauma continues long after the violence we endured, through stigma, fear, displacement, and the destruction of families and communities.

We have lost loved ones, livelihoods, and trust in the institutions meant to protect us. Families who once relied on us are now broken. Speaking about these experiences reopens deep wounds, but silence only allows perpetrators to continue unchallenged. By speaking, we reclaim our dignity and demand accountability.

Justice, to us, is more than punishment. Justice is recognition of our suffering and restoration of our dignity. It is the assurance that such crimes will not be repeated against future generations. It means that no one – not soldiers, not commanders, not political leaders – stands above the law. Our voices must shape the processes that concern us.

We call upon national and international actors including governments, the United Nations, regional bodies, and civil society, to act with urgency and courage. Survivors cannot wait indefinitely for justice. We demand:



Accountability: Prosecute perpetrators of CRSV and other crimes at every level, from direct actors to senior commanders, through domestic, regional, and international mechanisms, including universal jurisdiction where needed.



An End to Impunity: Break the cycle of silence, denial, and inaction that has allowed such crimes to continue for decades.



Survivor-Centred and Trauma-Informed Responses: Ensure that psychosocial, legal, and humanitarian support prioritises survivors' dignity, agency, and safety.



Recognition of Survivors' Perspectives: Respect and uphold survivors' own definitions of justice, whether through accountability, recognition, protection, or the ability to rebuild our lives in dignity.

We do not ask for pity. We demand justice. Our voices testify not only to suffering but also to resilience and the determination to break this cycle of violence. We refuse to let our pain be forgotten, and we refuse to allow perpetrators to escape accountability because of rank, power, or political compromise. On behalf of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in Myanmar, we call on all national and international actors to act decisively and without delay, to end the culture of impunity and to build a just and peaceful future for our country. Justice delayed is justice denied. The time for promises has passed – the time for action is now.

In solidarity,

Survivors United for Rights and Justice – SURJ

About LAW

Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) is an independent, non-profit organisation comprised of human rights lawyers and jurists working to improve access to justice in fragile and conflict-affected regions across the South Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. LAW adopts a survivor-centred, gender-sensitive, and trauma-informed approach to empower individuals and communities who have suffered gross human rights violations and international crimes, to seek redress and end the cycle of impunity through legal aid, strategic litigation, technical assistance, and advocacy.

LAW has worked on the Myanmar context since the inception of its Rohingya Crisis Programme in 2018. **LAW's Myanmar Post-Coup Programme** focuses primarily on seeking justice and accountability for international crimes committed since the February 2021 coup. A cornerstone of the programme is to provide support to civil society organisations and grassroots partners working to document evidence of sexual and gender-based crimes through capacity building and technical assistance, while also empowering survivors in the pursuit of justice.

Acknowledgements

LAW dedicates this report to the thousands of victims and survivors of sexual and gender-based crimes in Myanmar – which continue to be perpetrated across the country with impunity. We extend our deepest gratitude to those who have shared their experiences with us and entrusted us with their hopes for the future. Your courage, determination, and strength inspire and guide our work.

Our work with Myanmar survivors is enabled by our partners, without whom the work is not possible, and who, for decades, have served as tireless advocates in the pursuit of justice and accountability. This includes the documentation and field data teams working on the ground to expose violations, often at immense personal risk. Their support at every stage of these investigations was indispensable, including the humanitarian workers, human rights defenders, and specialists working tirelessly to care for survivors and address sexual and gender-based crimes.

The team further thanks our consortium partner, the Mukwege Foundation, for its support in advancing survivor-centred responses to sexual and gender-based crimes in Myanmar. We are equally grateful to Serenity Counselling for providing on-going mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) referrals for partners and survivors who formed the basis of these findings.²



Warning: This report contains references to and descriptions of sexual and gender-based violations and crimes, including conflict-related sexual violence, which may be distressing for some readers.

Acronyms

AA	Arakan Army
CRSV	Conflict-related sexual violence
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EAO	Ethnic Armed Organisation
ERO	Ethnic Revolutionary Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBC	Gender-based crimes
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IFM	Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar
IIMM	Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NUG	National Unity Government
PDF	People's Defence Force
SAC	State Administration Council
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
TFGBV	Technology-facilitated gender-based violence
UN	United Nations

Key Terms

Conflict-related Sexual Violence

Refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilisation, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict. That link may be evident in the profile of the perpetrator, who is often affiliated with a State or non-State armed group, which includes terrorist entities; the profile of the victim, who is frequently an actual or perceived member of a persecuted political, ethnic or religious minority group or targeted on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity; or through other existing circumstances, such as a climate of impunity; cross-border consequences such as displacement or trafficking, and/or violations of a ceasefire agreement. The term also encompasses trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual violence or exploitation, when committed in situations of conflict.³

Gender-based Crimes

Crimes under the Rome Statute that involve acts of sexual violence, reproductive violence, and/or other forms of gender-based violence that are perpetrated or threatened against an individual on the basis of their sex and/or socially constructed gender roles. As noted by the Office of the Prosecutor's "Policy on Gender-Based Crimes," crimes involving sexual violence and crimes involving reproductive violence are often closely related in terms of their motivations, forms, or impacts. For example, rape can result in pregnancy and other health consequences, such as infertility or sexually transmitted diseases. Similarly, torture involving an individual's genitals can affect sexual and reproductive functions. Crimes involving sexual violence and crimes involving reproductive violence, however, are not necessarily coterminous. Coupled with this, the sexual nature or meaning of an act may depend on context, community, or even individual, and not all manifestations of GBC involve gender-based violence that is sexual or reproductive in nature. It is therefore critical, as advised by the Office of the Prosecutor, to conduct rigorous, intersectional analyses to understand and characterise these acts appropriately within unique contexts.

Myanmar/Burma

In 1989, the then-ruling regime changed the country's name from Burma to Myanmar without consultation from the people. Many survivors and local partners prefer the use of Burma as the name change to Myanmar is reflective of the military regime's longstanding impunity and abuse of power.

Many other countries and international organisations, including the United Nations (UN), have accepted the term "Myanmar." In official statements issued by the National Unity Government and other ethnic governance bodies, Myanmar is used.⁴

LAW recognises the historic brutality of the Myanmar military and significance of the continued use of Burma by many partners; Myanmar is used throughout this report to reflect current usage by domestic political stakeholders and the international community.

Rape

A perpetrator invades the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. The invasion is committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent (Definition of 'rape' under article 7(1) (g)-1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ('Rome Statute')).



Sexual Violence

A perpetrator commits an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or causes such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine consent (Definition of 'sexual violence' under article 7(1)(g)-6 of the Rome Statute).

Survivor/victim

LAW uses the terms survivor and victim throughout this report to refer to individuals who have directly experienced or witnessed a violation or abuse. Both terms are used as LAW recognises that not all victims are survivors. Some do not survive the violation or abuse, whilst others do survive but identify as a victim, not a survivor. In many instances throughout this report, LAW uses the term or identity indicated by the survivor/victim themselves.

Junta/Myanmar military/State Administration Council/Tatmadaw

The Myanmar Armed Forces are known as 'Tatmadaw', which translates into 'Imperial or Royal Armed Forces' with the suffix 'daw' or 'taw' denoting 'royal' or 'sacred'. In Myanmar, they are usually referred to as 'Sit-Tat', meaning Sit (Armed or Military), Tat (Forces).⁵ The Tatmadaw is composed of the Myanmar Army, Navy, Air Force, and Military Security Affairs (*Sa Ya Pha*).

On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw deposed the democratically elected government, and transferred power to the Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar's Armed Forces, Min Aung Hlaing. The military-led system of government (junta) subsequently established the SAC, to which Min Aung Hlaing delegated his legislative power.⁶

Given the Tatmadaw's historic brutality, including international crimes described in this report, LAW uses the terms 'Myanmar Armed Forces', 'Myanmar military' or 'junta' (instead of the Tatmadaw with its 'royal' or 'sacred' connotations)⁷ interchangeably throughout this report to describe Myanmar's Armed Forces, except in instances where specific terminology was used by interviewees or when quoting existing sources. References to 'Myanmar Security Forces' encompass the Myanmar Armed Forces, Military Security Affairs (i.e. military intelligence or *Sa Ya Pha*), and the Myanmar Police Force ("Myanmar Police") (collectively, the "Myanmar Security Forces").⁸ Although technically outside of the Armed Forces chain of command,⁹ 'SAC' is also used interchangeably with 'junta' and to designate junta-controlled forces when specific military units are not identified, and/or when used by international reports or interviewees.

Technology-facilitated gender-based violence

An act of violence perpetrated by one or more individuals that is committed, assisted, aggravated, and amplified fully or in part using information and communication technologies or digital media, against a person on the basis of their gender.¹⁰

Executive Summary

Beginning shortly after the country's independence in 1948, and for over 70 years, sexual and gender-based violence and crimes have been a perverse and defining feature of the Myanmar military's offensive operations. The widespread and systematic use of CRSV, particularly against ethnic minority communities, became a starkly evident pattern during the 2017 "clearance operations" against the Rohingya, where brutal acts of sexual violence entered the public conscious as a central component of the overall logic of violence.

Since the February 2021 coup, LAW finds that incidents of CRSV have increased countrywide, including in Sagaing, Magway, Chin, and Kayah/Karenni States. Women, girls, men, and boys, as well as members of the LGBTQI+ community, are routinely subjected to a range of these violations.

The extensive and coordinated CRSV now documented in Sagaing and Magway represents a new and deeply troubling development. These regions, which before the coup had not experienced such patterns, are now sites of widespread violations. This shift reflects a geographic and strategic expansion of sexual violence as a deliberate instrument of repression and represents Myanmar's shifting conflict landscape.

Despite the significant prevalence of CRSV, several factors – including entrenched patriarchal stigma, the absence of adequate survivor support services, and near-total impunity – continue to obstruct access to accountability and redress for survivors.

This report analyses the scope, scale, and prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence and crimes in Myanmar's post-coup context, situating current violations in these four regions – Sagaing, Magway, Chin State, and Kayah/Karenni State¹¹ – within historic patterns across more than 70 years, while also highlighting emerging dynamics. Beyond the violence and crimes themselves, it examines obstacles to documenting sexual violence, particularly CRSV, as well as the impact of these challenges on justice and accountability for survivors across diverse gender and ethnic identities.

By mapping the violations and barriers, and identifying the support services required, the report lays a foundation for advancing survivor-centred justice initiatives and ending impunity for CRSV and SGBV in Myanmar.¹²

Key Findings

- **Myanmar Security Forces, including Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers, military intelligence officers, and pro-military militias including the Pyusawhti, continue to commit CRSV consistent with entrenched patterns of historic military abuse. The so-called "Ogre Column," operating in Sagaing, has been particularly notorious for its brutality.**
- **Incidents committed by security forces typically fall into two distinct categories: (i) CRSV perpetrated by Myanmar military forces in the course of carrying out offensive military operations; and (ii) those perpetrated by police or intelligence forces during arrests, interrogation, and detention.**
- **Rape, frequently multiple-perpetrator or "gang" rape and often accompanied by extreme physical cruelty, has been deliberately employed as a weapon of war throughout the country, with particular prevalence in Sagaing, Magway, Chin, and Kayah/Karenni States. Widespread and systematic attacks against civilians, including at checkpoints and during military operations, are marked by the routine use of sexual violence to extinguish communal resistance and collectively punish perceived opponents.**

- Within interrogation facilities, including Shwe Phyi Thar, Ye Kyi Ai, Nine-Mile (Yangon Region), Mandalay Royal Palace (Mandalay Region), and Mya Taung (Sagaing Region), sexual violence is deployed as a tool of humiliation and torture. CRSV is most prevalent during first instances of interrogation and occurs less frequently once individuals are transferred to prison. These acts constitute the crimes against humanity of sexual violence, torture, and persecution on both political and gendered grounds, as well as war crimes.
- No one is spared, as victimisation cuts across all groups. Victims include women (including pregnant women and women with disabilities), men, boys, girls, and LGBTQI+ individuals. Victims' reported ages ranged from five to 70-years-old. These crimes occur in villages, cities, and interrogation sites across the country. Their nationwide spread and relentless repetition confirm that they are not isolated incidents but part of a deliberate, orchestrated campaign involving the multiple and repeated commission of crimes.
- Since the coup, elements of the armed resistance, including People's Defence Forces (PDF),¹³ Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs), and the Arakan Army (AA),¹⁴ have themselves committed CRSV. While some incidents appear opportunistic or individually motivated, others involved the targeting of Myanmar military or other (affiliated) factions. In some reported cases, resistance forces threatened victims with weaponised violence to participate in sexual acts. These violations have been reported in northern Shan, Rakhine, Kayah/Karenni, Kachin, Chin, Sagaing, and Magway, where opposition offensives have intensified since 2024. Despite the absence of a systematic policy, such acts nonetheless reflected a persecutory intent and have contributed to the overall environment in which CRSV has become normalised across all sides of the conflict.
- At the same time, domestic and intimate partner violence has also risen sharply, reflecting how sexual and gender-based violence now permeates every layer of Myanmar's protracted "polycrisis" of armed conflict, political breakdown, and economic collapse. These crimes further engage State obligations under international human rights law (IHRL) to prevent, investigate, and punish.
- Across the country, sexual and gender-based violence and crimes remain consistently under-reported. Survivors face stigma, reprisals, and a near-total absence of material and psychosocial support. Many remain trapped in silence: throughout its investigations, LAW and its partners faced grave security risks in gathering testimony, compounding the overall invisibility of these violations and obstructing pathways to justice, including universal jurisdiction.
- Despite these immense barriers, survivors persist in sharing the violations and harms they have suffered while demanding justice at extraordinary personal risk. That they continue to speak in the face of stigma, surveillance, and serious threats is both a testament to their resilience and an indictment of the international community's failure to protect them.
- In light of the consistent patterns documented since the February 2021 coup, there are reasonable grounds to believe that Myanmar Security Forces, including the Myanmar Armed Forces, military intelligence, police, and allied militias such as the Pyusawhti, committed war crimes and crimes against humanity since the February 2021 coup.
 - These include rape, sexual violence, and sexualised torture used systematically during military raids, at checkpoints, and in interrogation centres. These acts constitute the crimes against humanity of rape, torture, persecution on political and gender grounds, and other inhumane acts, and the war crimes of rape, torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and murder, all committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on civilians.
- The report further finds that members of non-state armed groups, including the PDF, EROs, and the AA, have also perpetrated acts of rape, sexual violence, and sexual abuse linked to the conflict. Although these were largely opportunistic and not policy-driven, they nonetheless constitute war crimes under international law.

The foregoing findings must be situated within the historical context of the Myanmar military’s systematic perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence and crimes and the entrenched impunity that has shielded perpetrators from accountability.

Recommendations

1. Prioritise Effective Methods to End Impunity and Hold Perpetrators Accountable

○ Initiate structural investigations within domestic jurisdictions

- Where possible, states should initiate structural investigations in their own domestic jurisdictions to prosecute gender-based crimes committed in the post-coup context under the principle of universal/extraterritorial jurisdiction.
- Where and when necessary, states should amend or instate national legislation that allows for the prosecution of international crimes, including gender-based crimes.

○ Initiate new sanctions relevant to evidence of perpetrated gender-based crimes


- States should initiate sanctions against identified perpetrators and relevant actors responsible for gender-based crimes.
- States should also continue to enforce sanctions against individuals and entities supporting the Myanmar military, which contribute to and enable perpetrators of gender-based crimes.

○ Support and advocate for progress regarding on-going international investigations and accountability processes

- Member States should initiate a resolution for the UN Security Council to immediately refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation into violations of international law committed since the coup, including GBC, occurring within the territory of Myanmar.
- States should enforce all arrest warrants issued for perpetrators of gender-based crimes (and other international crimes) committed in Myanmar, including against perpetrators residing in or traveling through their domestic territories.
- States should support and advocate for the ICC Office of the Prosecutor to formally accept NUG’s Article 12(3) declaration, which would allow the ICC to expand the current investigation to additional crimes committed within Myanmar, including since the 2021 coup.

○ Support reparative justice measures

- Member States must call for securing reparative measures for crimes committed against individuals across Myanmar, including supporting the **Myanmar Trust Fund Initiative**, to develop a trust fund for victims, particularly in light of the UN Human Rights Council’s Resolution 59/2 (2025), which called upon Myanmar to ensure “reparations” for the victims and survivors of the past and on-going grave human rights violations and atrocity crimes committed at the hands of the Myanmar military.¹⁵





○ **Support grassroots documentation efforts and emerging governance systems**

- States and international donors should continue to support grassroots and civil society documentation efforts by funding sustainable, holistic approaches which recognise challenges and respond to identified needs. This would include support to addressing practical challenges, such as internet connectivity, and include capacity building for data collectors and on-the-ground documenters, such as trainings in forensic investigative techniques.
- States and international donors should support emerging justice and governance systems in the development of gender justice outcomes, including increasing women's participation in federal democratic processes and governance systems. This would include prioritising support to increase gender sensitive applications in adjudicating or pursuing accountability for gender-based crimes in growing domestic systems outside of the national judicial system, particularly in areas with the highest levels of sexual violence.

2. Improve Protection Measures to Ensure Meaningful Survivor Engagement in International Justice Proceedings

- States should improve witness and victim protection practices within their own domestic systems to provide effective risk mitigation and support services to survivors who have been resettled or displaced. This includes effective witness protection services and available MHPSS referrals which are accessible to survivors. Those hosting displaced communities should provide needed support and protection services to prevent re-victimisation, including the adoption of decriminalisation policies regarding immigration and trafficking, where applicable and feasible.
- States must fast-track third-country resettlement processes for witness and survivors participating in international justice proceedings, or domestic proceedings under the principle of universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction.

3. Support and Provide Holistic Survivor-Centred Services

- Donors, humanitarian agencies, and service providers should prioritise and adequately fund specialised services for survivors which address the barriers to documentation and reporting gender-based crimes. This includes holistic material support – legal, MHPSS and medical support – and adopting survivor-centric approaches to justice initiatives.
- Donors should continue to provide support to the Alliance Against CRSV-Myanmar, including its member organisations and collective work, as it leads the way for future advocacy and initiatives to combat CRSV, end impunity, and hold perpetrators of gender-based crimes accountable in Myanmar.

Methodology

Throughout its investigations and reporting, LAW applies the evidentiary standard of “reasonable grounds to believe,” pursuant to the best practices of international fact-finding. Under this standard, a finding is made where there is a reliable body of information, consistent with other material, that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to believe that the conduct occurred.

For the present report, LAW relied on multiple, independent sources of information, including first-hand survivor and witness testimony, interviews with grassroots actors and human rights defenders, and documentation by civil society organisations with familiar access to affected communities. Desk research included a comprehensive review of over 70 documents, including UN, non-governmental organisation (NGO), and academic publications, civil society reports, and specialised analytical reports. Information was corroborated with attention to patterns of conduct and consistency over time. In line with the principle of “do no harm,” LAW prioritised the safety, dignity, and agency of survivors throughout both the investigation and analysis process.

Overall, the findings that form the basis of this report were drawn from an intersectional methodology designed to capture diverse lived experiences across Myanmar’s ethnic communities and geographic areas since the coup in February 2021. They corroborate that sexual and gender-based violence and crimes are committed against women, men, girls, boys, and LGBTQI+ individuals in the post-coup context throughout the country.¹⁶ Sexual and gender-based crimes committed against journalists and political activists indicated the targeted use of such violence as a means of political suppression.

Testimonies and documentation were gathered through interviews and focus group discussions conducted by the LAW team as well as trained data collectors and documentation teams working in Chin State, Ayeyarwady Region, Sagaing Region, Bago, Kayah/Karenni State, Kachin State, Magway, Yangon, and in the Thai-Myanmar and India-Myanmar border areas. Participants were identified and selected through a “purposive sampling” approach and were known to work specifically on documenting sexual and gender-based violence and/or supporting survivors. Across all locations, the evidence revealed a disturbing and credible pattern of violations.

Lastly, interviews and data analysis for this research consistently emphasised the significant challenges with documenting and verifying known cases of sexual violence, a factor which continues to contribute to severe under-reporting of sexual and gender-based crimes since the coup. Recorded numbers of instances varied greatly.¹⁷ Almost all documenters interviewed for this report indicated that reported figures do not reflect the true scale of violations. As further detailed below, numbers of documented sexual and gender-based violence and crimes cases are not necessarily verifiable due to security risks, stigma, and access limitations. Consequently, the actual numbers of sexual and gender-based violence and crimes are undoubtedly much higher than the number of instances reported, documented, or officially recorded.



A 70-year History of Sexual Violence

For more than 70 years, Myanmar has experienced perennial non-international armed conflicts,¹⁸ characterised by the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and later genocide.¹⁹ The perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence and crimes by the Myanmar military has been a consistent feature across these seven decades.

Over the decades prior to the February 2021 coup, the widespread and systematic use of rape was employed primarily as an instrument of oppression against ethnic minority communities,²⁰ tactics specifically used to demoralise and oppress those seen as potential threats or (perceived) dissidents,²¹ in acts violating the rule prohibiting collective punishment.²² For example, in Shan State, between 1996 and 2001, rape was used systematically against civilians during counterinsurgency campaigns.²³ Over the ensuing years, the use of rape against ethnic communities spread to Kachin, Karen, and Chin States during on-going military offensives.²⁴

More recently, between 1998 and 2015 alone, 85 per cent of victims identified perpetrators as being in official uniform,²⁵ though impunity and deeply entrenched systems of gender inequality continue to exacerbate sexual and gender-based violence and crimes across the country.²⁶ Subsequent patterns include the Myanmar military's perpetration of sexual violence against Rohingya communities, including

rape, multiple-perpetrator or "gang" rape, sexualised torture, sexual slavery, genital mutilation, and forced nudity, now seen as a hallmark of the "clearance operations" of 2016 and 2017.²⁷ Regarding the Rohingya, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM)²⁸ described the use of sexual violence in Myanmar as "part of a deliberate, well-planned strategy to intimidate, terrorise and punish a civilian population and force them to flee."²⁹ The FFM concluded that the scale and brutality of sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls indicated, as one factor, the military's genocidal intent to destroy the Rohingya community.³⁰ It further found sexual violence as a recurring feature of operations against ethnic groups in Kachin and Shan States between 2011 and 2018, a finding consistent with "historical patterns of abuse in ethnic areas for decades prior" and one which civil society partners had been documenting for years, along with persistent calls for justice and accountability.³¹

The subsequent Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM)³² has continued to collect evidence of CRSV and SGBV perpetrated both prior to and since the coup.³³ These acts, both then and now, are tactics used by military forces with impunity, as no Security Forces personnel have been prosecuted for these crimes, due in part to constitutional immunities (Article 445) and an overtly biased judiciary.





09

February 2021 Coup

On-going sexual and gender-based violence and crimes committed in the post-coup context can be broadly categorised as falling into three distinct types of violations:

- 1. Those perpetrated by Myanmar Security Forces – including units of the Myanmar Armed Forces, police, as well as members of allied militias – carried out during offensive military operations and in detention or interrogation settings;*
- 2. Those attributed to non-state armed groups (e.g., resistance forces); and*
- 3. Incidents of domestic and intimate partner violence. This final category of sexual and gender-based violence, although not explicitly tied to the commission of specific military acts in furtherance of operational objectives related to the conflict, is nonetheless exacerbated by a range of factors and perpetuated in an atmosphere of armed conflict related to the coup, including economic instability, displacement, and forced conscription.*

LAW's investigations in the post-coup period have revealed the extent to which sexual and gender-based violence and crimes have only intensified since 1 February 2021, immediately after the military coup that deposed the democratically elected government led by the

National League for Democracy (NLD). Despite a profound escalation, as detailed below, cases of sexual and gender-based violence and crimes continue to be grossly under-reported with the actual scale impossible to fully verify.

Violations by Myanmar Security Forces

Since the coup, acts of violence perpetrated by the Myanmar Security Forces – including the military, military intelligence forces, and the police force – demonstrate repeating and intersecting patterns of abuse.³⁴ In over 150 cases involving 320 victims of CRSV documented between February 2021 and November 2024, 90 per cent of victims and survivors had been subjected to sexual violence by the Myanmar military, with 20 per cent of them murdered following the assaults.³⁵ Women and LGBTQI+ individuals were singled out, although men were likewise targeted, albeit to a lesser degree.³⁶

LAW's analysis revealed that incidents committed by security forces were broadly distinguished between: (i) sexual and gender-based violence and crimes perpetrated by Myanmar military forces in the course of carrying out offensive military operations; and (ii) those perpetrated by police or intelligence forces during arrests, interrogation, and detention.

CRSV Perpetrated During Offensive Military Operations

The most brutal acts of CRSV committed by the Myanmar military since the coup continue to emerge from resistance areas.³⁷ They occurred before, during, and after offensive military attacks, with SAC soldiers carrying out horrific acts of sexual violence during their assaults or raids on villages.³⁸ In some instances, acts of CRSV were perpetrated during raids on civilian homes conducted under the pretext of "checks to search for resistance actors," or in cases where military forces abducted and took women to their camps.³⁹

As armed groups proliferated following the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military's conduct became increasingly brutal and punitive in its response.⁴⁰ Such measures included village-to-village raids, where military forces and affiliated fighters separated the men from women, set fire to homes and destroyed property, tortured or executed civilian detainees or fighters rendered hors de combat, and forced civilians to serve as human shields.⁴¹ A particularly pervasive pattern

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during these raids and village attacks was how the men were frequently arrested, while the women were subjected to sexual violence and, in some instances, brutal acts of torture, often in front of their family members.

The use of CRSV against women was staggeringly common during these village raids.⁴² LAW's investigations revealed the most patterned incidents connected with the raids involved rape, multiple-perpetrator rape, including of pregnant women and girls,⁴³ as well as other forms of sexual violence committed alongside torture, murder, and the destruction of property, including arson.⁴⁴ In most cases, the sexual violence itself amounted to egregious acts of torture.

LAW's field investigations recorded multiple instances of sexual violence committed by Myanmar military forces during offensive raids between 2021 and 2023. In one verified incident in Gangaw Township, Magway Region, soldiers raped a 14-year-old girl during an assault on Gangaw, while her father and brother were arrested during the same operation.⁴⁵ During the same attack, a woman was raped and subsequently killed, alongside six men who were executed by military personnel.⁴⁶

Men in affected villages were also subjected to sexual violence by Security Forces, used not only as a method of torture but as a deliberate tactic to degrade, emasculate, and humiliate them, which left them with severe and enduring psychological and social harm.⁴⁷ One soldier recounted how he was forced by the military command echelon to rape men.⁴⁸ In other instances, LAW heard of young boy conscripts who were reportedly made to rape another man, after having been threatened with rape themselves.⁴⁹ Incidents of sexual violence and abuse against members of the LGBTQI+ community further demonstrate the Myanmar military's weaponisation of gender identity and sexual orientation.⁵⁰

As referenced above, the most prevalent type of sexual violence experienced during these raids was rape, with multiple-perpetrator rape being second.⁵¹ Incidents of this nature laid bare exceptional physical cruelty, including biting, cutting, and the insertion of objects into victims' bodies as methods of sexualised torture and intimidation.⁵² Pregnant women and adolescent girls were also raped, some multiple times, with soldiers raping women in front of their fathers, husbands, and other family members.⁵³ Bodies of captured and killed women evinced distinct signs of

sexual violence, with some victims' corpses found with items inserted into their vaginas.⁵⁴ Survivors face lifelong trauma, infections, fistulas, and stigma.

In the Central Dry Zone – spanning much of the Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing Regions – such instances were particularly widespread in areas under effective SAC military control, with fewer instances occurring in recaptured or ERO-controlled areas.⁵⁵ As in other areas, the most prevalent forms of sexual and gender-based violence and crimes included cases of rape and multiple-perpetrator rape, often accompanied by torture or the subsequent murder of victims.

Similar patterns were documented in and near Chin State, where additional grave instances of sexual violence occurred during offensive military operations, including genital mutilation, the cutting off or burning of penises, and instances of rape perpetrated in the presence of family members.⁵⁶ In July 2021, for example, following a massacre in Kani Township, Sagaing Region, two survivors described how several victims found next to Yin village had been visibly tortured to death, were unclothed, and had “their [penises]” cut off.⁵⁷ LAW also documented harrowing cases in which Myanmar military forces tortured young boys, inflicting extreme physical and psychological abuse marked by deliberate cruelty and degradation.⁵⁸

During a raid on Akluai village in Tedim Township in 2024, Myanmar military forces twice raped a woman who was seven months pregnant. In extreme acts of brutality, soldiers bit the woman's vagina and smeared toothpaste onto her wounds while beating her husband with their rifles, leaving him bleeding heavily from the nose and mouth.⁵⁹

Other women were raped and tortured in front of their husbands during village raids:

[One] was a 27-year-old young mother who recently gave birth to a month-and-a-half baby. While the Myanmar military was raiding [the village], three soldiers entered the home and raped her while holding her husband, who was in the same room, at gunpoint and forcing him to watch and crouch on the floor.⁶⁰

In another documented case from 2023, SAC soldiers entered a village in Daw Hpa Khoh Township, Taw Oo District, during clashes between combined KNLA and PDF forces, where they looted, burned, and killed livestock. While some were able to flee, a SAC soldier choked and raped a 90-year-old woman who was hiding in her house.⁶¹

Documented instances of sexual violence were most common when military personnel were stationed by a village, with villagers at risk of recurring violations. Through its analysis, LAW found that, where troops were stationed by villages, civilians lived under occupation-like conditions that facilitated recurring violations. At temporary bases, checkpoints, or administrative posts, their physical proximity to civilians dramatically increased opportunities for abuse. Some civilians, especially women and girls, were regularly required to pass by soldiers for daily activities which created repeated contact under coercive circumstances.

In such cases, perpetrators typically included the Myanmar military personnel but also affiliated Pyusawhti (or Pyu Saw Htee) pro-military militia members, who operated primarily in central Myanmar and areas under State control where they had been trained and received weapons from the Myanmar military.⁶² Similarly, in the Ayeyarwady Region, SAC forces conducted searches and seized property, which were frequently coupled with torture and sexual violence.⁶³



The heightened risk of sexual violence near areas where military personnel were stationed, engendered among villagers a constant fear of severe forms of physical and sexual abuse villagers – particularly women and girls. For example, a military task force reportedly primarily from the

99th Light Infantry Division (LID 99), with reinforcements from units such as Light Infantry Battalion 708 (LIB 708) and Infantry Battalion 11, known as the “Ogre Column,” has been notorious for committing brutal acts of sexual violence while operating in southern Sagaing Region since early 2023, including beheading, sexual mutilation, and rape.⁶⁴

Military checkpoints

LAW’s investigations further indicated that SAC-controlled checkpoints across the country emerged as key sites of vulnerability for women and girls, with interviewees consistently highlighting them as epicentres for sexual and gender-based violence.⁶⁵ Women detained at such checkpoints regularly reported being sexually assaulted or raped, alongside incidents of verbal abuse, invasive body searches, and sexually explicit intimidation.⁶⁶ Testimonies and reports suggest that these violations occurred more frequently at night, when women travelled alone, or with younger male companions.⁶⁷ Often manned by junta soldiers and the Pyusawhti, the Zalote checkpoint, situated on the eastern side of Monywa City in Sagaing, emerged as particularly notorious for acts of sexual violence since 2022, with many women and girls in the area fearing to pass through.⁶⁸

Indeed, fear of sexual violence at military checkpoints has severely restricted women’s and girls’ freedom of movement, forcing many to avoid markets, schools, and clinics and deepening their economic dependence. This enforced immobility reinforces patriarchal control, as families confine women for “protection” while internalising militarised gender norms. The result has been a climate of fear that governs women’s daily lives, perpetuating social exclusion and silence around sexual and gender-based violence.

Chin State

A mother of two children reported being arrested by Myanmar military personnel while traveling from Vomsemh to Tedim to renew her ID card. She was interrogated at the local police station where the Myanmar military was also camping, raped by over 20 soldiers, and then murdered.⁶⁹

Interviewees also detailed recurring patterns revealing how sexual violence functions within interrogation practices and military offensives as a calculated means to assert power and inflict collective punishment.⁷⁰ LAW finds that

the brutality of these acts carried out during interrogations or offensives has also reinforced collective trauma, with entire communities internalising sexual violence as a warning of what happens when civilians engage with state structures. This fear has further isolated rural women from essential services and documentation processes in Chin State, entrenching both gender-based and geographic marginalisation.

CRSV in interrogation or detention, including torture

Since the 2021 coup, CRSV committed during interrogation or in detention settings has become increasingly pervasive. LAW's analyses revealed the extent to which CRSV is not confined to military ground operations and hostilities but rather institutionalised within a network of interrogation facilities. Among the most frequently identified by interviewees were five sites primarily located in urban or centrally controlled areas, namely: Shwe Phyi Thar, Ye Kyi Ai and Nine-Mile (Yangon Region); Mandalay Royal Palace (Mandalay Region); and Mya Taung (Sagaing Region).⁷¹

These five facilities, though overall distant from the main theatres of armed conflict, emerged as some of the key sites for the commission of CRSV against both women and men. Their geographic concentration in Myanmar's political and military centre likely reflects the deliberate choices by the SAC to centralise interrogation and maintain control over alleged perpetrators and (perceived) dissidents in closed environments, away from hostilities.⁷²

Each of the five interrogation facilities identified by LAW reportedly operate under the oversight of regional commands of the Myanmar military and the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA).⁷³ Though their inner workings have been characterised by high levels of secrecy and restricted access, interrogees describe what can only be viewed as uniform protocols indicative of an organised structure rather than – as in the case of members of armed groups – individual or opportunistic sexual violence.⁷⁴ Field evidence points to the use of sexual violence as a sorting mechanism. Detainees deemed “defiant” or “politically committed” were reportedly subjected to more severe assaults before transfer, while those considered minor offenders were released after sexual humiliation intended to instil fear and silence. This pattern appears to demonstrate the integration of sexual violence into administrative decision-making rather than its occurrence as opportunistic misconduct.

For example, women and men interrogated for suspected links to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), PDFs, or EROs were commonly transported to the interrogation sites from the conflict areas. LAW finds that the removal of interrogees from their localities is itself a gendered practice that overwhelmingly isolates women from the men in the communities that serve as support networks. This places women in reshaped environments where they are surrounded by security personnel and face heightened vulnerability to CRSV, including sexual coercion.⁷⁵

Within each of the five interrogation facilities, sexual violence functioned as both a method of interrogation and an instrument of torture or humiliation. Survivors' accounts revealed the consistent use of sexualised humiliation, forced nudity, sexual assault with objects, multiple-perpetrator rape, and threats of rape against family members. Male detainees were frequently subjected to beatings and anal penetration intended to degrade them, reflecting gendered patterns of torture found in prior State military operations.⁷⁶

Detainees, including women, men, and LGBTQI+ individuals, are routinely subjected to sexualised torture and gender-based violence during both the interrogation and detention phases of their confinement.⁷⁷ Acts of sexual violence perpetrated in interrogation or detention settings comprised a wide range of forms, including but not limited to rape and multiple-perpetrator rapes; sexualised touching; beatings; the insertion of objects into genital or anal openings; burning of sexual body parts with cigarettes; mutilation of reproductive body parts; forced full or partial nudity; and invasive body searches.⁷⁸ These types of interrogatory torture and detention settings are strategically employed to inflict severe physical and psychological harm, particularly when coupled with other brutal forms of torture, such as the use of sticks, wires (electric wires wrapped together), tasers, rollers (to roll on shins), sharp objects, and other weapons including firearms.⁷⁹

These crimes are often accompanied by broader patterns of physical and psychological violence. Since the coup, over 674 women have been arrested by the junta for political reasons, with some 1,853 reportedly murdered.⁸⁰ A vast majority of arrested women experience forms of physical, psychological, and/or sexual abuse⁸¹ while arrests have been recorded nationwide, with official and makeshift sites in Yangon City accounting for the highest numbers of women arrested and detained.⁸²

Most documented cases of torture, including sexualised torture, predominantly occurred during the initial instances of arrest and questioning at interrogation sites, with fewer incidents of sexualised violence reported once individuals were formally charged and transferred to a prison.⁸³

Cases of rape, sexual violence, and other forms of sexualised torture in such settings indicate a broad pattern of CRSV as an interrogation tactic.⁸⁴ Interrogators frequently employed both verbal and physical threats of sexual violence, as well as actual physical assaults. In one example, a woman who was arrested after attempting to flee a crackdown on protests was brought to the police station and interrogated. She recounted how she was “forced to kneel down” while a soldier stood in front of her, “positioning his penis directly in front of her face” and threatening to shove it inside her mouth, “claiming that she was not answering his questions.”⁸⁵ In another example, military interrogators reportedly threatened a woman with rape, while slapping her in the face and kicking her abdomen.⁸⁶ The woman reported that during her interrogation, military personnel “made sexualised comments and suggested sexual activities, including rape” threatening “if you like, I can give the sexual pleasure you want now, and I would rape your ass as well,”⁸⁷ inflicting enduring psychological trauma and acute emotional suffering.⁸⁸

A similarly brutal case involving the sexual assault of two female students between the ages of 20 and 25 years occurred at a detention centre in Yangon as documented by Equality Myanmar:

“[T]hey did not know who exactly who it was because they put a black bag over their heads so they can’t identify them. They were accused of being related to the people’s defence forces. So, if somebody supports the opposition, they will arrest them and try to get them to admit that they are supporting this group. If they don’t answer as they want, then they use torture including rape.”⁸⁹

Similar incidents of sexual violence in interrogation centres have been reported, including, for example, students and youths being tortured by having a bamboo stick inserted into their anus,⁹⁰ as well as a reported incident of a woman suffering severe injuries from the forcible insertion of a mop into her vagina.⁹¹

Sexual violence perpetrated against gender diverse individuals represents another particularly pervasive form of abuse in detention settings. For example, one LGBTQI+ activist reported being kicked in the genitals by soldiers to force them to “remember” their assigned gender, through acts intended to degrade and reaffirm gender conformity.⁹² Prison guards have also compelled other detainees to rape gay men, placed transgender women in male cells, and inflicted other forms of sexualised torture, including the beating of genitals, the burning of breasts with cigarettes, and sexually explicit verbal abuse during interrogation.⁹³ These tactics were commonly reported in the treatment of transgender women.⁹⁴ Reliable evidence reviewed by LAW similarly demonstrated sexual and gender-based violence committed in detention settings, including verbal degradation through gendered and homophobic insults, coupled with threats of rape and other forms of violence directed at individuals because of their gender or sexual orientation.⁹⁵



In addition to sexual violence, tactics such as full-time monitoring via cameras installed in prison wards and invasive full body searches are also frequently employed with the intent to intimidate, coerce false confessions or signed false statements (which may subsequently be relied upon in judicial proceedings), and suppress political detainees.⁹⁶ During searches when detainees leave for or return from prison hearings, both male and female detainees are subjected to body searches where their breasts, genitalia, groin area, or buttocks may be touched. During these searches, female detainees have been ordered to remove menstrual pads, even while actively menstruating.

LAW further received cases of male detainees, if deemed suspicious while passing through X-ray machines, being taken to the toilets and forcibly searched by other non-political detainees by inserting their fingers into the anus.⁹⁷

Detailed accounts such as these demonstrate a consistent and systematic pattern of sexualised torture employed to suppress political activism and silence perceived opposition to the coup. As noted by the IIMM, physical and mental torture, including instances of sexualised torture and sexual intimidation such as those detailed above, are deliberately utilised to coerce detainees into providing information, induce false confessions, or reveal additional information that may be perceived as contributing to resistance and political opposition to the coup.⁹⁸ Political activists and journalists, in particular, have been targeted for arrests, questioning, and interrogation tactics using torture, including sexual violence. As noted in the UN Secretary-General's 2023 report on CRSV, these tactics are employed so pervasively in post-coup Myanmar as to suggest the use of sexual violence as "part of the repertoire of political violence to intimidate and punish opponents,"⁹⁹ a shift rendered more insidious by the simultaneous escalation of widespread sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.¹⁰⁰

Ye Kyi Ai, situated near Insein Prison in Yangon,¹⁰¹ was repeatedly identified as one of the main centres for sexual torture. Interrogation sessions at Ye Kyi Ai often had the deliberate aim of disorienting detainees. Survivors recounted repeated assaults over several days, accompanied by threats that images or videos of the assaults would be leaked online to shame their families. Such acts appear to reflect the SAC military's use of sexual violence not only as a means of coercion but as a psychological weapon, designed to undermine social standing and deter political activism.¹⁰²

At Shwe Phyi Thar, a facility on the outskirts of Yangon, sexual violence appeared to be systematically linked to the interrogation of women.¹⁰³ Interrogators reportedly threatened women with rape,¹⁰⁴ with several survivors reported being forced to listen to the screams of other detainees being assaulted, creating an overwhelming climate of fear.¹⁰⁵

Across these facilities, sexual violence reflects clear patterns of purpose and intent. It serves four interrelated objectives: punishment, extraction of information, deterrence, and destruction of identity.

Violations and Abuses by Non-State Armed Groups

Violations perpetrated by resistance forces

In addition to documented incidents perpetrated by the Myanmar Security Forces, LAW's investigations coupled with credible information collected, consolidated, analysed, and preserved demonstrates an increase in violations committed by members of non-state armed groups, including EROs – longstanding ethnic armed groups with political and military wings fighting for autonomy – and the PDF post-coup resistance movements aligned with the NUG and composed largely of civilians directly participating in hostilities (DPH).¹⁰⁶ For the purposes of this report, LAW classifies as non-state armed group violations all incidents of CRSV committed by members of PDF, EROs, or other pro-revolutionary and armed resistance actors, including civilians engaged in DPH.

Since 2024, increased incidents of such sexual violence have coincided with expanding opposition offensives in

northern Shan State, Rakhine State, Kayah/Karenni State, and Kachin State, which have exacerbated both conflict and displacement.¹⁰⁷ In Chin State, specific instances of sexual violence perpetrated by the AA have also been noted, though investigations are on-going.¹⁰⁸

CRSV perpetrated by members of non-state armed groups include rape, attempted rape, as well as various forms of sexual harassment, with credible reports further indicating the perpetration of rape and sexual violence prior to (extrajudicial) executions, in some instances.¹⁰⁹ For example, in 2022, three female victims, two of whom were 15-years-old, were raped by armed group members before being murdered, as part of the extrajudicial execution of seven civilians accused of being junta informants.¹¹⁰ Further incidents of sexual violence perpetrated by members of opposition groups included instances of rape, rape followed by killing, the sexual assault of women accused of collaborating with the military, the rape of a woman with a

disability, and women compelled, under threat or coercion, to engage in sexual acts in exchange for the release of detained relatives or guarantees of safety.¹¹¹



LAW's investigations consistently revealed that the motivation behinds these types of violations differed significantly from those committed by State military forces and allied militia groups: rather than acts intended to instill fear or collectively punish civilians, violations committed by members of non-state armed groups were often described as individually motivated and opportunistic, and perpetrated in an atmosphere of impunity and instability amidst the on-going armed conflict.¹¹² As such incidents appear to be perpetrated primarily by opportunistic individuals, they did not seem to reflect an organisational policy or entrenched culture within the ranks of the non-state armed groups. This stands in contrast to the patterns of CRSV committed by Myanmar military forces, which reveal a deliberate and systematic policy of using sexual violence as an instrument of control, humiliation, and collective punishment.¹¹³

In some cases, victims and survivors may include non-combatant civilians as well as fellow resistance fighters. Women combatants in the PDF experienced sexual harassment or sexual violence with no viable or enforceable mechanisms for reporting and accountability, or experience their complaints ignored or minimised by their superiors. In other reported cases, resistance forces threatened victims with weaponised violence to participate in sexual acts.¹¹⁴ For example, a civilian woman was whipped while partially nude:

"In our revolution, some armed individuals would stay at a woman's house. They would use their phones if they wanted to, or drink alcohol if they wanted to. And this woman couldn't dare to tell them, 'Hey, don't come to my house, don't drink alcohol, don't gather around' because they were armed. So they would drink. At that time, the leader of those armed individuals, instead of disciplining

his own subordinates, ordered the woman to be flogged for "allowing" them. So, we found that woman, and we had to provide medical treatment for her. After pulling her aside and talking to her, we asked, 'Why don't you report this to the National Unity Government? Why don't you report it to your own government organisations?' She said, 'They only gave me flogging now. If I report it and they investigate and punish him, he could come and kill me at any time. Now, it's just a punishment that causes injuries. If he kills me, I'll die first. So I don't dare to report.'"¹¹⁵

This account reflects not only the prevalence of CRSV in resistance-controlled areas, but also the absence of protective structures and effective recourse. The reluctance to report or seek accountability by survivors and witnesses was a consistent characteristic of CRSV perpetrated by members of non-state armed groups and their civilian allies.

In one case in the Magway region, a rape victim filed a complaint, but was told by an officer that they were "in the process of developing and organising the force and did not have proper completed rules and regulations yet."¹¹⁶ Similarly, in a case documented in Sagaing, a rape victim complained to the seniors and village security team, but no action was taken beyond confiscating the perpetrator's weapons.¹¹⁷ In situations where survivors and perpetrators reside in the same area or community, legal action, or access to justice of any form, is additionally complex and often unsafe for survivors to pursue.¹¹⁸

Significantly, reporting may even be perceived as undermining revolutionary forces and the revolutionary process itself. In some instances, survivors were warned "not to disclose such abuses to the outside world."¹¹⁹ This culture of silence exacerbates the already significant barriers to survivor justice by posing extraordinary logistical and psychological hurdles to pursuing accountability in the revolutionary space.

Finally, LAW notes several emerging reports of individuals from resistance groups committing acts of sexual harassment, including verbal harassment, both online and offline, with victims predominantly women involved in the resistance movement. For example, LAW found instances of resistance actors verbally harassing local women

market vendors.¹²⁰ Additionally, increasing instances of online or digital harassment – referred to collectively as technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) – have also surfaced.¹²¹ In some instances, female fundraisers experienced harassment online with pornographic photos and videos or being asked for sexual favours in return for additional donations.¹²² These incidents highlight a growing extension of gender-based harm into the digital sphere, further compounding the risks faced by women participating in the resistance.

Domestic and intimate partner violence as SGBV

Additionally, LAW found a significant rise in instances of domestic and intimate partner violence since the coup, due in part to a multitude of compounding and intersecting environmental and socio-economic factors related to the on-going conflict, including, notably, the enforcement of the conscription law in 2024.¹²³ Commodity prices are high, leaving many families to struggle to balance drastically increasing expenses with limited incomes and job opportunities, while drugs and alcohol are readily available.¹²⁴ In other cases, LAW found instances of forced marriage for young women to avoid military conscription or secure economic stability for their families; yet in other cases, survivors of sexual violence have been forced to marry their rapists to avoid community expulsion and preserve village reputations.¹²⁵

As a direct result of these overlapping dynamics, there are reasonable grounds to believe that intimate partner

violence continues to be the most pervasive form of gender-based violence against women in Myanmar.¹²⁶ Cultural pressures to adhere to traditional gender roles also exacerbate stresses felt by men to perform as financial breadwinners in a decimated economic landscape, leading to feelings of inadequacy, emasculation, depression, and anxiety,¹²⁷ which are frequently expressed through violence in the home. As described by one interlocutor:

“Many men feel frustrated with themselves and drink alcohol. They don’t have an outlet, so they lash out at their wives and children, breaking pots and pans. They take out their frustration on their family members as a way to cope.”¹²⁸

This vulnerability is even further pronounced for those (forcibly) displaced or individuals living in internal displacement camps and near Myanmar’s borders.¹²⁹ LAW found that instances of domestic and sexual violence increased in these environments, with few avenues available to survivors to report abuse, seek protection, or pursue accountability. In Kayah/Karenni State, for example, sexual violence committed by intimate partners was regularly occurring within displacement camps.¹³⁰ Meanwhile, migrant women in neighbouring countries, such as Thailand, many of whom are undocumented, continue to face elevated risks of sexual violence from authorities, employees, and other civilians, with limited or no access to legal avenues for protection or redress.¹³¹

Under-documentation of CRSV and SGBV

As highlighted throughout this report, CRSV and SGBV remain significantly underreported across Myanmar. This trend, however, is not unique – armed conflicts around the world almost universally feature under-documentation, and women and girls are less likely to report CRSV and SGBV where gender inequality and discrimination predate hostilities.¹³² The stigmatisation of CRSV and SGBV, along with poor security and lack of trust in accountability mechanisms, can also contribute to underreporting.¹³³

Survivors also turn to silence as a coping mechanism when stigmatisation is present and other resources are

unavailable. Additionally, under-documentation of CRSV and SGBV was often even more pronounced in rural or remote areas where, for instance, weaker-than-average telecommunications systems limit access to online reporting tools, or when remote location prevents local gatherings and makes travel to central urban locations impossible.

Barriers to documenting CRSV and SGBV in Myanmar’s post-coup context

Nearly all commonly observed barriers to reporting and documenting CRSV and SGBV are acutely present in

Myanmar, factors often exacerbated by on-going violence, repression, and impunity since the 2021 coup. Across nearly all interviews and data analysed for this report, instances of CRSV and SGBV in the post-coup context were significantly underreported, regardless of the scope or nature of specific instances of sexual violence. Building strong evidence of cases from eyewitnesses remains challenging.¹³⁴ As such, recorded and documented incidents of CRSV and SGBV are widely recognised as far below the actual scale of violations. While LAW's local partners and survivors frequently cited numerous challenges to adequately and safely documenting CRSV and SGBV cases, challenges typically fell into one of two categories:

1. Barriers faced by those operating inside the country; and
2. Barriers which significantly inhibited or prevented survivors from disclosing and/or reporting experiences of CRSV and SGBV.

Both categories reflect deep systemic limitations, including practical and psychological, that continue to distort the full scope and scale of CRSV and SGBV in Myanmar.

Barriers faced by those operating inside the country

Those working inside Myanmar consistently operate under immense risk. Despite employing comprehensive risk and security practices, documentation teams encountered instances of surveillance, intimidation, and harassment by both SAC forces and resistance groups.¹³⁵ One interviewee recounted that, as a consequence of on-going work unrelated to data collection for this report, a member of her team had been arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison, while additional team members noted that they dared not even use VPNs as they were under surveillance.¹³⁶ These security concerns present an additional barrier to consistent and comprehensive documentation of CRSV and SGBV.

In addition to security threats, those working on the ground contend with practical or logistical barriers, such as harsh weather conditions and seasonal monsoons and/or landslides, which further limit their activities.¹³⁷

In areas of active armed conflict, restrictions due to military operations also limited access. These constraints are further compounded by frequent internet disruptions, which affected communication with survivors, reducing the

ability to follow-up with them for additional clarifications, or in some cases, to seek corroborating evidence.¹³⁸ In other instances, documenters faced only singular opportunities to communicate with survivors or witnesses, often immediately following the perpetrated violence, and were unable to have additional contact with them afterwards.¹³⁹

Moreover, technical expertise and capacity gaps also played a role in limiting the thorough documentation of specific forms of CRSV and SGBV. While many local documentation teams employ or collaborate with experienced data collectors who have been documenting human rights violations for decades, specific training in documenting CRSV and SGBV remains more limited. Interviewees widely noted the need to train data collectors on CRSV-specific documentation techniques, including working with and interviewing survivors of sexual violence.¹⁴⁰ These types of trainings, however, take time and resources which may not be available. Trainings also require reliable internet access or long-distance travel, both of which can be prohibitively expensive or logistically difficult in the current context. As a result, even where commitment and expertise exist, certain documentation efforts continue to fall short of strict evidentiary standards required for future prosecutorial procedures.

Barriers impacting survivors

In addition, victims and survivors themselves encounter profound barriers to disclosing experiences of CRSV and SGBV, speaking out, and, ultimately, seeking justice and accountability for these violations.

Survivors are often reluctant to speak due to intimidation and fears of retaliation, even in areas and/or communities where significant trust has already been established. Military authorities may explicitly threaten survivors or witnesses against reporting CRSV or even speaking with documenters.¹⁴¹ Such threats have, in some cases, forced survivors who already established first contact with LAW to rescind their willingness to participate in a conversation about their experience or be interviewed. Real or perceived threats and surveillance further inhibited cooperation, and survivors may only be willing to speak to individuals they deeply trust, often causing delays in disclosure and rendering trust-building a crucial, albeit slow, process.¹⁴²



Restricted movement and fear of repercussions further compound these challenges. Some survivors fear accepting even humanitarian (cash) assistance due to potential reprisals.¹⁴³ Additionally, many survivors are simply not “emotionally ready to disclose their experiences.”¹⁴⁴ As one interlocutor explained:

“[Some women] don’t want or dare to openly say they were subjected to violence under the military council, they are afraid to speak out. So, what are the overall circumstances? In the initial incidents, if a woman was sexually assaulted, during the period when cases were filed, people had to consider things like missing work to deal with the case. And also, money is often prioritised. So, there are expenses involved in going to pursue a case. Even if you are in the right, you have to bribe the administrative officials and local authorities in your community so that they are in your favour. So, sometimes, they don’t open up because of these difficulties.”¹⁴⁵

Even in areas where survivors were able to safely report and/or be interviewed, survivors frequently cited interview fatigue and re-traumatisation as reasons to avoid participating in additional interviews.¹⁴⁶ Survivors may be approached multiple times by local documenters and international investigations alike, often without clear expectations about how their information will be used, particularly concerning international legal or accountability mechanisms. This can lead to frustration and a reluctance to participate in repeated interviews, especially as few reported cases result in effective justice or accountability.

Another major barrier to survivor reporting is the severe lack of established, coordinated support services. Support services for survivors, including material, legal, and psychosocial support, remain scarce or non-existent in many regions. Online services require stable internet

connections, which may be inaccessible unless survivors travel long distances. Additionally, many survivors are forced to relocate frequently due to on-going risks and instability, making access to consistently delivered services even more challenging.¹⁴⁷

As analysed further below, available yet weak enforcement mechanisms further hinder survivors from reporting or even speaking about their experiences. Domestic legal frameworks are currently unavailable for effective prosecution of these crimes, while emerging governance systems may not yet be fully viable or equipped with the capacity to handle such cases. For example, field documenters working in central Myanmar note that the emerging governance systems there, while developing, are “not [yet fully] functioning”, leaving a current gap for survivors to seek legal recourse and justice for CRSV and SGBV.¹⁴⁸

One interviewee emphasised that it is clear why victims do not want to answer when interviews and investigations are conducted, remarking that “everyone in Myanmar knows, for over 70 years under military rule... if I go to court for something, or to a police station, the authorities drag out the time, and a lot of money is spent [and still there is no accountability].”¹⁴⁹

Finally, survivor vulnerability is exacerbated by a widespread culture of victim-blaming and deeply embedded gender inequality. Awareness of CRSV remains low in Myanmar, and social stigma continues to surround survivors, especially within families.¹⁵⁰ Long-held gender biases and patriarchal discourse which perceive women as “the weaker sex,” along with long-held stigmas which discriminate against survivors, inhibit survivors’ reporting of sexual violence and contribute to a sustained, continued culture of impunity.¹⁵¹

10

Legal Analysis

** Throughout the remainder of this report, LAW applies the term “gender-based crimes” (GBC) as defined in and consistent with the ICC Policy on Gender-Based Crimes.¹⁵²*

Although instances of sexual and gender-based violence committed since the 2021 coup are severely underreported and, in many cases, challenging to verify, credible evidence as collected by local documenters and the IIMM, as well as

findings detailed in this research, demonstrate clearly that instances of sexual violence perpetrated in the post-coup context likely constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes.¹⁵³


Crimes Against Humanity

Sexual violence perpetrated by Myanmar Security Forces since the 2021 coup constitute crimes against humanity, namely rape, torture, persecution on political and gender grounds, and other inhumane acts, all committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on civilians.

policy (rather than wholly spontaneous or an aggregate of isolated acts of violence).¹⁵⁵ This policy may be authorised or ordered by commanders or implemented in practice, as driven from below and tolerated by commanders. In some circumstances, a policy may be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action consciously aimed at encouraging said attack, although the existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of government action.¹⁵⁶

While singularly sufficient to demonstrate crimes against humanity – and primarily analysed here – CRSV represents one portion of the course of conduct constituting the Myanmar military’s attack on the civilian population. Since the 2021 coup, the IIMM, NGOs and CSOs have documented sufficient evidence demonstrating the Myanmar military’s commission of multiple crimes against humanity, including murder, enforced disappearance, torture, severe deprivation of liberty, and other inhumane acts causing great suffering.¹⁵⁷ The Myanmar military has committed indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population nationwide, “bombing schools, hospitals, and religious buildings with total impunity.”¹⁵⁸ In the months immediately following the February coup, security forces responded to massive protests with excessive and lethal force, and forcibly detained or disappeared actual or perceived political opponents. These abuses have been widespread, broad and consistent.¹⁵⁹

As detailed extensively above, Myanmar Security Forces have carried out numerous incidents of CRSV, including sexualised torture,¹⁶⁰ rape (involving physical penetration and conduct amounting to “sexual coercion”), and sexual violence of comparable gravity to other offences enumerated in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.¹⁶¹



Crimes against humanity include the commission of one or more prohibited acts (under Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute), when committed in the particular context of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population where the perpetrator intentionally or knowingly committed the act(s) as part of the attack.¹⁵⁴

In analysing crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute, a further policy element requires that the attack be pursuant to or in furtherance of state or organisational

Documentation of these incidents of sexual violence, including rape, show consistent and repeated patterns across these “attacks” directed against the Myanmar civilian population, including but not limited to ethnic minority communities and those residing in areas of perceived junta opposition, establishing a “course of conduct” involving the multiple commission of prohibited acts.¹⁶² Data collected and as detailed throughout this report’s findings underscores that instances of sexual violence, including rape, are not “isolated” or limited to a singular offensive tactic but rather are consistently and repeatedly perpetrated by the Myanmar military across the country. Myanmar military forces frequently perpetrate acts of sexual violence which evidence shared common features and characteristics, including the commonly seen commission of sexual and gender-based violence in parallel with burnings, torture, and arrest of civilians.¹⁶³

Accounts from survivors and witnesses further confirm that these attacks, although characterised as part of military offensive operatives, are intended as “targeted” acts of violence against civilians implemented to intimidate and terrorise.¹⁶⁴ Civilian survivors of these acts of sexual violence are not incidental or accidental victims; rather, the Myanmar military specifically targets these populations based on one or more discriminatory grounds, including gender, ethnicity, religion, as well as real or perceived political affiliation or sexual identity.¹⁶⁵

Research findings strongly indicate that the Myanmar military has a consistent policy to attack these civilian populations based on the long-standing and historical use of sexual violence against ethnic communities and perceived political insurgents, coupled with historical and on-going impunity for perpetrated acts of CRSV against ethnic minority communities, including against the Rohingya. Furthermore, absent an explicit policy as such, the practice of the perpetration of sexual violence by lower-level personnel, coupled with tolerance by commanders, is clearly evident, as an “abundance” of widely available information and public accounts is “sufficiently alarming” to put military commanders on notice of the need to take measures to prevent and punish these crimes.¹⁶⁶

Similarly, the use of sexual violence, including rape, and sexualised torture in interrogation and detention settings – or alternative settings in which individuals are under “custody or control” of the perpetrator – have been consistently well documented throughout the country.¹⁶⁷

Evidence of tactics used to extract information, including forced confessions demonstrates broad patterns of abuse and sexualised torture not isolated to specific prison or detentions settings, and which are used against both men and women. Such instances of sexual violence and sexualised torture are not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions;¹⁶⁸ rather, these tactics are consistently and intentionally utilised to target civilian political activists, including those involved in peaceful protests, journalists, and individuals actually or perceived to be in opposition to the coup. Sexualised torture of this manner has come to be seen as “routine” during first instances of interrogation.¹⁶⁹ Again, such consistent and widely documented evidence of the routine use of sexualised torture in interrogation centres demonstrates an implicit policy to employ such interrogation methods to not only extract information, but to intentionally suppress and intimidate perceived post-coup political dissidents.¹⁷⁰

Further, although legally only one element is required, evidence demonstrates that these acts of sexual violence are both systematic *and* widespread. “Widespread” refers to “the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of targeted persons,”¹⁷¹ whereas “systematic,” refers to the “organised nature of the acts of violence”¹⁷² and whether there was a “pattern of crimes.”¹⁷³ Since the coup, the IIMM has found “ample indications” that crimes have been committed in Myanmar “on a scale and in a manner that constitutes a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population.”¹⁷⁴ Findings here reinforce that perpetrated sexual and gender based crimes are not targeted in a specific geographic area but instead are documented across broad regions of the country, as described above.¹⁷⁵ As detailed, research additionally supports the systematic use of sexual violence during offensive military attacks and in numerous interrogation settings as forms of intimidation, oppression and control.

Evidence of sexual violence committed by non-state actors as detailed above, likely do not constitute crimes against humanity, as many of these incidents are described as individually motivated or opportunistic crimes and unconnected to a broader organisational policy to attack a civilian population; nonetheless, some of the instances of sexual violence documented may likely still constitute war crimes as detailed below.

War Crimes

Sexual violence can be prosecuted as a war crime in both international armed conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). For sexual violence to constitute a war crime, it must occur in the context of an IAC or NIAC, and the perpetrator must be aware of the circumstances creating the IAC or NIAC.¹⁷⁶ There are multiple on-going NIACs in Myanmar, encompassing on-going conflicts which pre-date the coup, as well as those involving the Myanmar military and newly-emerged resistance forces.

Additionally, instances of sexual violence described in this report, including rape and sexualised torture committed by both the Myanmar military and resistance forces are sufficiently committed "in connection" to the NIAC. Instances of rape and sexualised torture committed by Myanmar military forces have been committed in the context of conflict since the 2021 coup in targeted areas to maintain or gain control over specific regions and, as described in detail, as a method of oppression and intimidation to quell any resistance to the unlawful military coup. Similarly, the use of sexualised torture in detention settings, although historically used, has been increasingly employed since the coup to specifically target actual or perceived political "opponents," that is, anyone who may reject the military coup or express opposition to the SAC.

Non-International Crimes

Documenters, data collectors, and survivors consistently report cases of sexual violence perpetrated by civilians, most frequently incidents of domestic and intimate partner violence. Although these may not constitute crimes under international law, they have become increasingly frequent due to economic instability, displacement, and additional factors of vulnerability consequential to and exacerbated by the coup and on-going conflict. In cases where these crimes do not necessarily meet requisite thresholds under international criminal law, they likely remain violations under Myanmar domestic law, as well as general violations of international human rights.

An examination of trends in SGBV in post-coup Myanmar reveals that many acts committed by the Myanmar military

The commission of war crimes by non-state actors have been prosecuted at both the ICC and ad hoc tribunals¹⁷⁷ and numerous cases of war crimes by non-state actors have been prosecuted under the principle of universal jurisdiction such as in France,¹⁷⁸ Germany,¹⁷⁹ the Netherlands,¹⁸⁰ and Sweden.¹⁸¹

The commission of crimes by non-state actors, if sufficiently connected to and occurring in the context of the conflict, may constitute war crimes, as demonstrated here regarding the perpetration of sexual violence, including rape, by resistance forces. Evidence as detailed in this report describes instances of sexual violence committed by PDFs, EROs, and other armed actors. Although frequently described as "individually motivated," these acts of sexual violence are committed in the deeply entrenched atmosphere of impunity and instability directly connected to the on-going conflict. These acts of violence are often committed by armed actors, with reports of the use of threats with weapons to perform or participate in sexual acts. Viable or enforceable accountability mechanisms are limited or non-existent, further exacerbating and compounding the pervasive climate of vulnerability connected with the on-going conflict. Assuming the requisite nexus to the conflict, further analysis would be necessary to determine whether each instance of sexual violence would sufficiently constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.¹⁸²

and civilians fall squarely within the definition of rape under the Myanmar Penal Code.¹⁸³ However, the absence of legal provisions specifically addressing the severity of crimes such as multiple-perpetrator rape results in a significant disparity between the gravity of the offence and the punishment prescribed. Section 375 of the Myanmar Penal Code provides that "a man is said to commit rape who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the five following descriptions: "against her will; without her consent; with her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her in fear of death or of hurt; with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be

lawfully married; with or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age.”¹⁸⁴ Penetration is sufficient to constitute sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. A further exception is provided under Section 375 that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.¹⁸⁵

A further impediment to justice lies in the jurisdictional framework: acts of rape committed by members of the Myanmar Armed Forces while on active duty are adjudicated through court-martial proceedings.¹⁸⁶ This arrangement poses a substantial barrier to justice for survivors, as the military – both the perpetrator and the adjudicating authority – exercises considerable control over the process. Given the Myanmar military’s entrenched impunity and the lack of judicial independence, there is minimal, if any, prospect that such crimes will be meaningfully addressed within either military or civilian courts.

Sexual violence perpetrated by members of revolutionary forces presents comparable challenges for accountability. While the shifting political landscape contributes to practical obstacles in prosecution, the legal vacuum within emerging governance systems presents a critical but often overlooked issue. Although rape may be prosecutable in the courts established by revolutionary actors, other prevalent forms of SGBV – such as sexual harassment and domestic and intimate partner violence – remain inadequately addressed. In the absence of specific legal provisions, these offences are often treated under general provisions on “hurt” or “grievous hurt,”¹⁸⁷ failing to recognise their gendered nature or ensure appropriate redress for survivors.

Accountability and Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, including CRSV, in the Post-Coup Context

The foregoing report details violations of both Myanmar domestic and international law, with documented incidents of the Myanmar military’s sexual violence amounting to both crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as resistance forces’ sexual violence amounting to war crimes. Additional incidents of sexual violence, which may not constitute international crimes, nonetheless demonstrate violations of Myanmar domestic law and a severe violation of international human rights.

Despite clear evidence of the GBC committed since the February 2021 coup, as well as evidence that these crimes are not only on-going but have continued to escalate since 2021, accountability for GBC, including CRSV, in Myanmar remains severely limited with few effective avenues to address on-going GBC available to date. Due to the narrow legal definition of rape, Myanmar’s domestic courts were able to prosecute only 562 rape cases in 2024, with just 27 cases in Sagaing Region, 6 in Karenni, 39 in Magway Region, and none in Chin State. These figures highlight the severely limited scope of accountability.





International Judicial Mechanisms

While several notable cases have progressed at international mechanisms, with significant milestones towards holding senior military leaders accountable, accountability specifically addressing GBC remains limited.

International Criminal Court

These milestones include the on-going investigation at the ICC. In November 2019, upon application of the Office of the Prosecutor, Pre-trial Chamber III of ICC authorised the opening of an investigation into the situation of Myanmar/Bangladesh.¹⁸⁸ The Prosecutor has since proceeded with an investigation into alleged crimes within the Court's jurisdiction committed against the Rohingya civilian population.

As Myanmar has not ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC's jurisdiction for crimes remains limited to those cross-border crimes against humanity such as deportation and persecution allegedly committed at least in part in the territory of Bangladesh, a state party. Importantly, this includes the crime against humanity of gender persecution; GBC committed exclusively inside Myanmar since the coup, however, are excluded from the ICC's jurisdiction.¹⁸⁹

In July 2021, the NUG lodged a declaration with the Registrar of the ICC under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, "accepting the Court's jurisdiction with respect to international crimes committed in Myanmar territory since 1 July 2002".¹⁹⁰ Acceptance of NUG's declaration would allow the ICC to investigate additional crimes committed inside the country, including those committed since the coup.¹⁹¹ To date, the Office of the Prosecutor has acknowledged receipt of the lodged declaration but has not otherwise issued a formal response. In 2021, LAW partnered with Debevoise & Plimpton

LLP to file an Article 15 communication, urging the Office of the Prosecutor to accept NUG's declaration and to extend the territorial scope of investigation to cover crimes falling within the ICC's jurisdiction committed in Myanmar since 1 July 2002.¹⁹² LAW is still awaiting an official response four years later. Potential future ICC acceptance on NUG's declaration will most likely depend on a resolution regarding on-going contestation over whether NUG legitimately represents Myanmar,¹⁹³ and to what extent the NUG controls the territory of Myanmar.¹⁹⁴

In November 2024, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan filed an application for an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar military, for alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya during the 2017 clearance operations. At time of writing, however, the application remains pending before the Pre-Trial Chamber.¹⁹⁵

International Court of Justice

Additionally, in November 2019, the Republic of Gambia (The Gambia) filed an application before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning alleged violations of Myanmar's obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), to which Myanmar is a signatory.¹⁹⁶ Following multiple written submissions by both parties and preliminary objections by Myanmar, the Gambia submitted its Reply on May 23, 2024, with Myanmar filing its Rejoinder on December 30, 2024, thus concluding written proceedings for the case. Oral hearings are anticipated to commence in early 2026. Despite the significance of the case before the ICJ, and the specific inclusion of incidents of sexual violence, the case is necessarily limited to instance of sexual violence as acts of genocide against the Rohingya.¹⁹⁷

Universal and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

Given these significant jurisdictional limitations for prosecuting crimes committed inside Myanmar since the 2021 coup, including GBC, attention has turned to the use of the principle of universal and/or extraterritorial jurisdiction, a legal principle which allows for the prosecution of the international crimes under domestic law.¹⁹⁸

Notably, multiple cases have been filed under the principle of universal/extraterritorial jurisdiction to address crimes committed in the post-coup context, including filings in Germany, the Philippines, and Türkiye.¹⁹⁹

In 2019, Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) filed a complaint in Argentina on this basis alleging senior Myanmar officials committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya since 2012, including sexual violence. Significantly, on 13 February 2025, the Argentine Court issued arrest warrants for 25 Myanmar military and civilian officials, including Myanmar military Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing.²⁰⁰ This marked the first time which arrest warrants were issued against the Myanmar military, albeit for the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. LAW has

worked extensively on this case, most notably, by supporting and facilitating witnesses living in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh to travel to Argentina to participate in the proceedings. In May 2023, LAW accompanied seven witnesses (including six LAW clients), to Buenos Aires to provide testimony. Survivor engagement and participation, as supported in the Argentina case, remain crucial yet limited components in the pursuit of justice and accountability for GBC in Myanmar. Despite this significant progress, accountability in the Argentina filing nonetheless remains limited to crimes committed against the Rohingya community. At the time of writing, there is no singular case or investigation under international law actively pursuing accountability for specific instances of GBC committed in the post-coup context.

To address this significant accountability gap, LAW has submitted a complaint under the principle of universal jurisdiction focusing on instances of GBC and torture in detention and interrogation settings, among other international crimes. The submission addresses international crimes not yet covered in previous universal jurisdiction filings and specifically underscores the persecution of individuals on gender and political grounds following the 2021 coup.

Survivors' Call for Justice and Accountability

The challenges to documenting CRSV, as detailed throughout this report, continue to inhibit a fulsome approach to accountability for GBC committed since the coup. Limited mandates by UN entities, as well as lack of cooperation from State authorities, including in neighbouring countries, further contribute to these limitations.²⁰¹

For the people of Myanmar, the international community's response has been ineffective or limited, at best, permitting the on-going armed conflict in Myanmar and the perpetration of GBC to be overshadowed in the wake of additional escalating crises on the global stage.

Nonetheless, survivors' demands for justice and accountability for GBC remain steadfast and clear:

"I want effective action to be taken regarding this issue, so that the international community knows how

the people are feeling, how women are overcoming injustices, and that the lives they have destroyed are countless, that countless lives have been sacrificed and are still being sacrificed."²⁰²

"We have been hoping and asking for justice from the world since the beginning, and now it has been five years. The world is still turning a blind eye...The people of Myanmar desperately crave the world's attention and care."²⁰³

"I want international organisations to know and take action – that is worth what I have endured."²⁰⁴

Survivors remaining inside the country, as well as those displaced in border areas, continue to face immense personal risk and, in most cases, urgently require significant material support, including legal, medical, and psychosocial

and mental health support. Yet, survivors continue to work diligently in the pursuit of justice, to ensure their experiences are not forgotten, and that their voices and calls for justice are heard.

“For justice, [I] had to exchange almost all of my family and relatives... So, how do I see justice? I see it not just for myself but for the entire country.”²⁰⁵

The barriers detailed throughout this report underscore the immense hurdles survivors must overcome to report GBC or share their experience fully; without significant, holistic support for survivors – including available protection measures to support survivor participation in legal proceedings – survivors will remain unable to fully seek justice and perpetrators will continue to commit GBC with impunity. Despite these challenges, survivors continue to identify justice and accountability as distinct priorities for future peace and reconciliation in Myanmar.²⁰⁶

“My vision for our country is clear: I want a country without a military regime a country with self-determination, no bribery, and no discrimination against the poor. I want a fair and just society. More than anything, I want my life back.”²⁰⁷

“For me, the rule of law and justice is paramount; I want to see a country where no one is above the law.”

I’ve personally faced gender-based discrimination, and it’s something I absolutely don’t want anyone else to endure. My hope is for our country to become a peaceful and just society, and for my children, I envision a future with freedom, justice, and access to good education.”²⁰⁸

The impact of GBC on survivors as individuals, as well as on families and communities, is severe; while the impact of such crimes against ethnic minority communities has long been documented by grassroots partners, the full, long-term impact of these continuing violations specifically in the context of the coup will likely be immeasurable for many years to come.

“I used to be a reliable person for my family and even established a charity helping people in need. But right now, I truly cannot help anymore. I’m struggling so much that I can’t even support my family anymore. I’ve tried to get help, I’ve even talked to [a civil society partner], but we’ve encountered no justice yet. All I want is justice for the next generation, so they can keep up with the world. I desperately want our country to be peaceful, and for my family to finally have peace. I just want us to be able to think about the future again.”²⁰⁹



11

Conclusion and Recommendations

Findings in this report demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe the on-going commission of GBC committed in the context of the Myanmar military's 2021 coup constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. As detailed throughout, LAW's investigations reveal consistent and systematic perpetration of brutal acts of sexual violence; tactics historically used by Myanmar Security Forces against ethnic minority communities which are now increasingly employed in Bamar majority areas. The prevalence and patterns of on-going GBC highlighted throughout underscore that significant barriers remain to attaining accountability for these crimes and ensuring justice for survivors throughout the country.

While the severity of sexual violence in Myanmar is widely known and understood by almost all working in the context, documentation and collection of concrete data

of GBC fails to sufficiently capture the true scale and pervasiveness of these crimes, a factor which, although not determinative, most certainly contributes to the limited criminal prosecution under international law. It is incumbent on judges, prosecutors, and practitioners at all levels to prioritise effective prosecution of GBC, and the international community to support holistic, practicable approaches to survivor-centred justice and accountability pathways.

Immediate and sustained action is needed to ensure accountability for GBC in Myanmar and that justice is attainable for survivors from all communities throughout the country. In line with this urgent call, and to ensure that the voices of survivors in Myanmar are not forgotten, LAW recommends the following:

Prioritise Effective Methods to End Impunity and Hold Perpetrators Accountable

Initiate structural investigations within domestic jurisdictions

- Where possible, states should initiate structural investigations in their own domestic jurisdictions to prosecute GBC committed in the post-coup context under the principle of universal/extraterritorial jurisdiction.
- Where and when necessary, states should amend or instate national legislation that allows for the prosecution of international crimes, including GBC.

Initiate new sanctions relevant to evidence of perpetrated gender-based crimes

- States should initiate sanctions against identified perpetrators and relevant actors responsible for gender-based crimes.
- States should also continue to enforce sanctions against individuals and entities supporting the Myanmar military, which contribute to and enable perpetrators of gender-based crimes.

Support and advocate for progress regarding on-going international investigations and accountability processes

- Member States should initiate a resolution for the UN Security Council to immediately refer Myanmar to the ICC for investigation into violations of international law committed since the coup, including GBC, occurring within the territory of Myanmar.
- States should enforce all arrest warrants issued for perpetrators of GBC (and other international crimes) committed in Myanmar, including against perpetrators residing in or traveling through their domestic territories.
- States should support and advocate for the ICC Office of the Prosecutor to formally accept NUG's Article 12(3) declaration, which would allow the ICC to expand the current investigation to additional crimes committed within Myanmar, including since the 2021 coup.



Support reparative justice measures

- Member States must call for securing reparative measures for crimes committed against individuals across Myanmar, including supporting the **Myanmar Trust Fund Initiative**, to develop a trust fund for victims, particularly in light of the UN Human Rights Council's Resolution 59/2 (2025), which called upon Myanmar to ensure "reparations" for the victims and survivors of the past and on-going grave human rights violations and atrocity crimes committed at the hands of the Myanmar military.²¹⁰



Support grassroots documentation efforts and emerging governance systems

- States and international donors should continue to support grassroots and civil society documentation efforts by funding sustainable, holistic approaches which recognise challenges and respond to identified needs. This would include support to addressing practical challenges, such as internet connectivity, and include capacity building for data collectors and on-the-ground documenters, such as trainings in forensic investigative techniques.
- States and international donors should support emerging justice and governance systems in the development of gender justice outcomes, including increasing women's participation in federal democratic processes and governance systems. This would include prioritising support to increase gender sensitive applications in adjudicating or pursuing accountability for GBC in growing domestic systems outside of the national judicial system, particularly in areas with the highest levels of sexual violence.

Improve Protection Measures to Ensure Meaningful Survivor Engagement in International Justice Proceedings



- States should improve witness and victim protection practices within their own domestic systems to provide effective risk mitigation and support services to survivors who have been resettled or displaced. This includes effective witness protection services and available MHPSS referrals which are accessible to survivors. Those hosting displaced communities should provide needed support and protection services to prevent re-victimisation, including the adoption of decriminalisation policies regarding immigration and trafficking, where applicable and feasible.
- States must fast-track third-country resettlement processes for witness and survivors participating in international justice proceedings, or domestic proceedings under the principle of universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Support and Provide Holistic Survivor-Centred Services



- Donors, humanitarian agencies, and service providers should prioritise and adequately fund specialised services for survivors which address the barriers to documentation and reporting GBC. This includes holistic material support – legal, MHPSS and medical support – and adopting survivor-centric approaches to justice initiative.
- Donors should continue to provide support to the Alliance Against CRSV-Myanmar, including its member organisations and collective work, as it leads the way for future advocacy and initiatives to combat CRSV, end impunity, and hold perpetrators of GBC accountable in Myanmar.

Afterword

Statement by the Alliance Against CRSV-Myanmar

Overall, the survivor testimonies that form the basis of this report reveal not only the physical and psychological toll of the brutality of the CRSV inflicted upon them, but also the collective resolve of their communities to seek justice and accountability – despite facing constant threats, intimidation, and harassment from the State, and a deep stigma at the communal level that is culturally rooted. LAW honours the strength of these survivors for shedding light not only on the widespread and systematic nature of sexual and gender-based crimes across the country, but also on the diverse intentions and methods of the perpetrators, which has been crucial to advance criminal accountability, including through universal jurisdiction.

This report seeks not only to document violations but to guide survivor-centred action. By revealing the prevalence and underlying drivers of sexual and gender-based crimes since the coup, it aims to contribute to the broader pursuit of accountability. Ultimately, justice for survivors in Myanmar remains inseparable from their struggle for freedom, dignity, and democracy, which are goals that can only be realised

through the dismantling of military dictatorship and the establishment of a genuinely federal and democratic state.

The Alliance Against CRSV-Myanmar is committed to ending this culture of impunity surrounding sexual and gender-based crimes, including CRSV, amplifying the voices of survivors, and advocating for justice and accountability. This report and its findings stand as a powerful tool in that mission, and a critical reminder to the international community that the on-going perpetration of gender-based crimes in Myanmar must end. Justice demands global solidarity with survivors at the fore.

The Alliance Against CRSV-Myanmar (Alliance) is a coalition of rights-based organisations across Myanmar working to address the deeply ingrained culture of impunity which keeps survivors silent and makes justice difficult to achieve. Founded in June 2024, the Alliance serves as a collective platform to enhance coordination, build capacity, and amplify the voices of survivors in both national and international forums. The Alliance seeks to ensure that CRSV is not ignored in the country's struggle for democracy and justice.



Endnotes

Annex 1 accompanying this report was created by Security Force Monitor.²¹¹

Annex 1




Figure 1: Organisational Structure of Myanmar Security and Associated Forces²¹²

- The Myanmar Armed Forces includes the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but in practice, the Army (particularly Light Infantry Divisions) drives most operations against civilians and resistance groups.
- This publication was funded by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) as part of a multiyear project entitled "Empowering Survivors and Grassroots Actors to Document Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Myanmar." Its contents are the sole responsibility of LAW and do not necessarily reflect the views of DRL.
- UNSC, 'Conflict-related sexual violence: Report of the Secretary-General' (15 July 2025) UN Doc S/2025/389 ¶ 3 (*hereinafter* UN Doc S/2025/389).
- See for example National Unity Government, 'The National Unity Government's Position on the Joint Communiqué of the 58th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting' (16 July 2025) <[The National Unity Government's Position on the Joint Communiqué of the 58th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting - National Unity Government of Myanmar](#)> accessed 14 August 2025; Interim Executive Council of Karenni State, 'Statement on the Death of Innocent Civilians, Including Children and Women, in the Terrorist Military Junta's Aerial Attack' [statement] (6 September 2024) <[https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1F9SSN8W8V/?mibextid=wwXlfr](#)> accessed 14 August 2025.
- Ye Myo Hein, 'One Year On: The Momentum of Myanmar's Armed Rebellion' (*Wilson Center*, May 2022) <[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/ASIA_220519_OneYearOn-BRIEF_V1r2.pdf](#)> accessed 19 August 2025 (*hereinafter* Hein 2022).
- Under the Myanmar Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief holds absolute legislative, executive, and judicial power during a state of emergency, which the National Defence and Security Council declared following the February 2021 coup. On 31 July 2025, the junta announced the end of the state of emergency and dissolved the SAC, handing over government functions to the National Defence and Security Council. LAW continues to use 'SAC' as a term throughout this report given the SAC's existence at the time of research, writing, and documented violations.
- Desmond, 'Please don't call the Myanmar Military Tatmadaw' (*The Irrawaddy*, 25 May 2022) <[https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/please-dont-call-myanmar-military-tatmadaw.html](#)> accessed 25 October 2025.
- A figure demonstrating the chain of command-and-control structures of the Myanmar Armed Forces can be found at Annex 1.
- See Annex 1.
- UN Population Fund, 'What is technology-facilitated gender-based violence?' [brochure] (March 2023) <[https://www.unfpa.org/resources/brochure-what-technology-facilitated-gender-based-violence](#)> accessed 11 August 2025.
- While research undertaken for this report predominantly concentrates on GBC committed outside of Rakhine State, LAW and the research team acknowledges the serious perpetration of sexual violence committed in the 2017 "clearance operations" against the Rohingya community, as well as emerging reports of new waves of violence perpetrated by the Arakan Army, including instances of sexual violence, which have contributed to vast numbers of newly displaced Rohingya survivors. UN Doc S/2025/389, *supra* n 3 at ¶ 47; UNHRC, 'Courage amid crisis: gendered impacts of the coup and the pursuit of gender equality in Myanmar, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar' (1 July 2024) UN Doc A/HRC/56/CRP.8 (*hereinafter* UN Doc A/HRC/56/CRP.8).
- At every stage, the underlying research has built upon and reinforced the critical work of Myanmar civil society partners documenting and reporting these crimes, ensuring that their contributions are amplified and integrated.
- In May 2021, the NUG announced the formation of the PDF to protect civilians from the military junta, as a precursor to a Federal Union Army. As of October 2022, it was estimated that the PDF was comprised of approximately 300 battalions of between 200 and 500 troops each. They are commanded by the Central Command and Coordination Committee along with the Joint Command and Coordination, established by the NUG along with various ERO allies. Although the EROs are often not aligned with the NUG, they work closely with the PDFs. In ethnic areas, PDFs are operationally commanded by or affiliated with the EROs. They are formed, trained, and equipped as main combat forces by the NUG and its allied EROs, and each unit is structured triangularly with squads, platoons, companies and three battalions each. Ye Myo Hein, 'Understanding the People's Defense Forces in Myanmar' (*U.S. Institute for Peace*, 3 November 2022) <[https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/understanding-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar](#)> accessed 7 October 2025.
- Approximately 20 EROs, also known as EAOs, are involved in the conflict in Myanmar. EAOs operate for a variety of different purposes, including fighting to regain lost territory and protecting their ethnic kin from Myanmar military attacks. While the military capabilities and size of each EAO varies, six are generally considered to "have reasonable might": the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Shan State Army-North, the Restoration Council of Shan State Army, and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). In 2021, the UWSA alone was estimated to possess 30,000 troops, artillery, and armed drones. The AA, another powerful EAO, has conducted significant military operations in civilian communities. Andrew Ong, '2021/79 "Ethnic Armed Organisations in Post-Coup Myanmar: New Conversations Needed"' (*ISEAS*, 11 June 2021) <[https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-79-ethnic-armed-organisations-in-post-coup-myanmar-new-conversations-needed-by-andrew-ong/](#)> accessed 7 October 2025; UNHRC, 'Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar' (29 August 2025) UN Doc A/HRC/60/20 ¶ 35 (*hereinafter* UN Doc A/HRC/60/20).
- UNHRC, 'Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar' (17 July 2025) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/59/2 (*hereinafter* UN Doc A/HRC/RES/59/2). On 25 September 2024, at a high-level survivor-centred roundtable in New York during the UNGA, Deputy Minister Aung Kyaw Moe, Ambassador Beth Van Schaack, and Gambian Attorney General Dawda A. Jallow discussed how a UN trust fund could channel resources to victims across Myanmar. LAW's Antonia Mulvey urged swift UNGA action, and survivor Maung Sawyeddollah called for Rohingya voices to remain central to any new initiatives.

16. 10-001.
17. LAW Interview (LI) 6; For example, some data collection teams reported documentation of approximately 70 cases of CRSV committed by armed groups and over 100 by private individuals since 2024, while another team cited over 100 documented cases of CRSV between 2021 and 2025. LI1; 10-002. In Chin State, only 23 documented cases of GBC could be verified, although the known number cited by data collectors is much higher. LI7.
18. 10-002. In 1948, Myanmar, formerly the Union of Burma, gained independence from British colonial rule. Divisions emerged in the negotiated handover of the State, with ethnic minorities or nationalities advocating for autonomy and cultural independence against Bamar majority identity, resulting in the emergence of numerous armed groups, known as EAOs. REDRESS and Global Survivors Fund (GSF), 'Myanmar Study on Opportunities for Reparations for Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Beyond Survival' (March 2023) 15 <https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GSF_Report_MYANMAR_long_EN_March2023_WEB.pdf> accessed 10 July 2025 (*hereinafter* REDRESS and Global Survivors Fund (GSF) 2023) (citing Jessica Harriden, *The Authority of Influence: Women and Power in Burmese History* (NIAS Press 2012) 143). Following a brief period of parliamentary democracy, Myanmar remained under military rule almost continuously from 1962 to 2011, during which time the military was deeply ingrained in the country's economy and state bureaucracy, further inhibiting a full transition to a genuine democratic state. Fortify Rights and The Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School, "Nowhere is Safe": The Myanmar Junta's Crimes Against Humanity Following the Coup d'État (March 2022) 35 <<https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Nowhere%20is%20Safe%20-%20Fortify%20Rights%20Report.pdf>> accessed 10 July 2025 (*hereinafter* Fortify Rights & Schell Center 2022). 10-004. Ethnicity and conflict continue to be closely linked in Myanmar, with bitter disputes regarding appropriate forms of government, autonomy, and past grievances remaining unresolved today. Fortify Rights & Schell Center 2022, *supra* n 18; *see also* International Crisis Group, 'Identity Crisis: Ethnicity and Conflict in Myanmar' (28 August 2020) <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/312-identity-crisis-myanmar-ethnicity_0.pdf> accessed 10 July 2025.
19. UNHRC, 'Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar' (12 September 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/64 ¶¶ 84-89 (*hereinafter* UN Doc A/HRC/39/64).
20. Women's League of Chinland, 'Unsafe State: State-sanctioned sexual violence against Chin women in Burma' (March 2007) <<https://burmacampaign.org.uk/media/UnsafeState.pdf>> accessed 10 July 2025 (detailing instances of sexual violence committed by the Myanmar military in Chin State which suggest a clear pattern that is widespread and systematic) (*hereinafter* Women's League of Chinland 2007); Karen Women's Organisation, 'Walking Among Sharp Knives: The unsung courage of Karen women village chiefs in conflict areas of Eastern Burma' (2010) <<https://karenwomen.org/2010/08/27/walking-amongst-sharp-knives/>> (describing the prevalence of sexual violence committed by the military against women chiefs of Karen villages); WLB, 'Same Impunity, Same Patterns: Sexual abuses by the Burma Army will not stop until there is a genuine civilian government' (January 2014) <https://www.womenofburma.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/2014_Jan_SameImpunitySamePattern_English-final.pdf> accessed 10 July 2025 (describing the Myanmar military's on-going perpetration of sexual violence against women with continued impunity) (*hereinafter* WLB 2014).
21. *Ibid.*
22. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2005, Volume I: Rules (*hereinafter* ICRC Rules), at Rule 103
23. Shan Human Rights Foundation and Shan Women's Action Network, 'License to Rape: The Burmese Military Regime's Use of Sexual Violence in the On-going War in Shan State' (2002) 8 <https://shanhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Licence_to_rape-English.pdf> accessed 10 July 2025.
24. Women's League of Chinland 2007, *supra* n 20; WLB 2014, *supra* n 20; Karen Human Group, 'Foundation of Fear: 25 years of villagers' voices from southeast Myanmar' (October 2017) 78 <https://www.khrq.org/sites/khrq.org/files/khrq_foundation_of_fear_english_full_report_october_2017_w2.pdf> accessed 10 July 2025.
25. Kathleen Kuehnast and Gabriela Sagun, 'Myanmar's On-going War against Women' (*United States Institute of Peace*, 30 November 2021) <<https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/11/myanmars-on-going-war-against-women>> accessed 10 July 2025 (citing Davies, S. E., & True, J., 'The politics of counting and reporting conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence: the case of Myanmar' (2017) Volume 19, Issue 1, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 4-21).
26. UN Doc A/HRC/56/CRP.8, *supra* n 11 at ¶¶ 38-39.
27. Human Rights Watch (HRW), "All of My Body Was Pain": Sexual Violence against Rohingya Women and Girls in Burma' (2017) <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/burma1117_web_1.pdf> accessed 10 July 2025; Legal Action Worldwide, "Every Day, I Remember They Destroyed My Life": Long-Term Physical and Psychosocial Consequences of Genocidal Sexual and Gender-Based Violence the Myanmar Military Committed against the Rohingya in its 2017 'Clearance Operations' (November 2023) <<https://legalactionworldwide.org/gender-equality-gbv/research-report-every-day-i-remember-they-destroyed-my-life/>> accessed 19 August 2025 (*hereinafter* Legal Action Worldwide 2023).
28. Appointed by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2017 to investigate and establish facts related to the "clearance operations."
29. UNHRC, 'Sexual and gender-based violence in Myanmar and the gendered impact of its ethnic conflicts' (22 August 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/42/CRP.4 ¶ 72 (*hereinafter* UN Doc A/HRC/42/CRP.4).
30. *Ibid.* ¶ 96; *see also* Legal Action Worldwide 2023, *supra* n 27.
31. UN Doc A/HRC/56/CRP.8, *supra* n 11 at ¶ 59; *see also* UN Doc A/HRC/42/CRP.4, *supra* n 29 at ¶¶ 108-144.
32. UNHRC Res 39/2 (3 October 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/39/2 (IIMM Mandate). Established in 2018 to collect, preserve, and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011.
33. UNHRC, 'Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar' (11 July 2024) UN Doc A/HRC/57/18 ¶ 23, 27 (*hereinafter* UN Doc A/HRC/57/18); UNHRC, 'Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar' (14 July 2025) UN Doc A/HRC/60/18 ¶ 14 (*hereinafter* UN Doc A/HRC/60/18).
34. 10-012.
35. 10-018.
36. 10-012.
37. *Ibid.*
38. 10-019; 10-012.
39. *Ibid.*
40. 10-019.
41. *Ibid.*; LI6; LI8.
42. 10-002.
43. 10-017; 10-012.
44. 10-019.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. 10-018.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*
50. 10-012.
51. LI6; LI7; LI8; LI13.
52. 10-018; *see also* 10-012; 10-017.
53. 10-012.
54. *Ibid.*; 10-016; 10-020.
55. LI6.
56. LI7.
57. 10-021.
58. LI7.
59. As reported to LAW by civil society partner (October 2024).
60. As reported to LAW by civil society partner (October 2024).
61. 10-022.
62. LI8; *see also* Harry and Saw Kyaw Nyein, 'Why the name Pyusawhti is sowing fear in central Myanmar' (*The New Humanitarian*, 24 January 2025) <<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2025/01/24/pyusawhti-pro-junta-militia-sowing-fear-central-myanmar>> accessed 10 July 2025; International Crisis Group, 'Resisting the Resistance: Myanmar's Pro-military Pyusawhti Militias' (2022) <<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/resisting-resistance-myanmar-pro-military-pyusawhti-militias>> accessed 10 July 2025.
63. LI7; LI8.
64. 10-012; *see also* 10-018.
65. 10-012; 10-018; 10-016; 10-025.
66. 10-018; 10-012.
67. 10-018.
68. *Ibid.*
69. As reported to LAW by civil society partner (October 2024).
70. 10-019.
71. UNHRC, 'Situation of human rights in Myanmar – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights' (4 September 2024) UN Doc A/HRC/57/56 (*hereinafter* UN Doc A/HRC/57/56); Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 'Towards Accountability: The Urgent Need for Renewed International Attention to Sit-Tat's Crimes Against Humanity in Burma' (1 March 2023) <<https://burmacampaign.org.uk/media/Towards-Accountability-Crimes-Against-Humanity-in-Burma.pdf>> accessed 23 October 2025.
72. UN Doc A/HRC/57/56, *supra* n 71.
73. Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo leads Military Security Affairs, holding the position of Chief of Military Security Affairs from his appointment in 2020 to at least 26 August 2025. Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar, 'Fourth-Generation Generals Rise to the Heart of Power' (30 September 2025) <https://ispmyanmar.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ISP_FU2025_ENG_01.pdf> accessed 25 October 2025. Major General Toe Yi held the role of Deputy Chief of Military Security Affairs from at least 9 December 2020 until 1 February 2025, when he was demoted. The Irrawaddy, 'Myanmar Military Holds Meeting With Arakan Army Officials in Wa Region' (20 December 2020) <<https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-holds-meeting-arakan-army-officials-wa-region.html>> accessed 25 October 2025. Aung Thura, '3 Ministers Purged in Myanmar Junta's Latest Reshuffle' (*The Irrawaddy*, 3 February 2025), <<https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/3-ministers-purged-in-myanmar-juntas-latest-reshuffle.html>> accessed 25 October 2025.
74. UN Doc A/HRC/57/56, *supra* n 71; UN Doc A/HRC/60/18, *supra* n 33 at ¶ 16.
75. UN Doc A/HRC/57/56, *supra* n 71.
76. *Ibid.*; Amnesty International, 'Myanmar: Detainees Tortured to Crush Opposition to Coup' (2 August 2022) <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/myanmar-detainees-tortured-to-crush-opposition-to-coup>> accessed 23 October 2025; UN Doc A/HRC/60/18, *supra* n 33.

77. 10-012; 10-016.
78. 10-028; 10-017; 10-016; 10-029.
79. LI3.
80. 10-026; AAPP, 'Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup: 7 October 2025' (7 October 2025) <<https://aappb.org/?p=33323>> accessed 8 October 2025.
81. AAPP, 'Women Subject to Sexual Violence during the Spring Revolution under the Military Coup' (1 March 2024) 2 <https://aappb.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/signal-2024-03-01-115219_003.png> accessed 10 July 2025 (*hereinafter* AAPP 2024).
82. *Ibid.*
83. LI3.
84. 10-018.
85. LI3.
86. 10-028.
87. *Ibid.*
88. *Ibid.*
89. Johanna Higgs, 'The Silence We Bear': Conflict Related Sexual Violence in Myanmar' (*Equality Myanmar*, January 2025) 10 <<https://equalitymyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ConflictRelatedSexualViolence-Final-compressed-for-web.pdf>> accessed 10 July 2025.
90. LI3.
91. *Ibid.*
92. 10-012.
93. *Ibid.* See also Myanmar LGBTQIAs HRW Forum, 'Rainbow Amid the Storm: Exposing the Harsh Realities of FGBTQIAs in Post-Coup Myanmar' (May 2023) 40 <https://wp.progressivevoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/MLHRWF_RATSReport_FINAL_ENG-.pdf> accessed 5 August 2025.
94. 10-012; see also 10-031.
95. 10-017; 10-016.
96. *Ibid.* 10-029.
97. LI3.
98. UN Doc A/HRC/57/18 ¶ 24.
99. UNSC, 'Conflict-related sexual violence: Report of the Secretary-General' (22 June 2023) UN Doc S/2023/413 ¶ 13.
100. *Ibid.*
101. HRW, 'Myanmar: Teenager Describes Torture, Mock Burial' [news release] (22 June 2021), <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/22/myanmar-teenager-describes-torture-mock-burial>> (*hereinafter* HRW 2021) accessed 23 October 2025; AAPP, '8 Seconds of Silence: The Death of Democracy Behind Bars' (May 2006) <https://burmacampaign.org.uk/media/Eight_Seconds_of_Silence.pdf> accessed 23 October 2025; BBC News, 'Myanmar Insein: A rare glimpse inside a barbaric prison' (24 June 2023) <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65959508>> accessed 23 October 2025; Amnesty International, 'Myanmar: "No law at all": human rights violations under military rule' (30 September 1992) <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/asa160111992en.pdf>> accessed 23 October 2025.
102. UN Doc A/HRC/57/56, *supra* n 71.
103. HRW 2021, *supra* n 103; BBC News, 'Myanmar coup: The women abused and tortured in detention' (8 December 2021) <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59462503>> accessed 23 October 2025 (*hereinafter* BBC News 2021); Victoria Milko and Kristen Gelineau [Associated Press], 'There was no break – it was constant,' investigation finds systemic torture of detainees by Myanmar's military' (*PBS News*, 28 October 2021) <<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/there-was-no-break-it-was-constant-investigation-finds-systemic-torture-of-detainees-by-myanmars-military>> accessed 23 October 2025.
104. Victoria Milko and Kristen Gelineau [Associated Press], 'Myanmar's military uses systematic torture nationwide' (*Taipei Times*, 1 November 2021) <<https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2021/11/01/2003767101>> accessed 25 October 2025; Siobhan Robbins, 'Myanmar: "We were always hearing those tortured sounds" – claims of abuse and death in custody under country's military rule' (*Sky News*, 3 September 2021) <<https://news.sky.com/story/the-student-a-politician-and-a-uk-trained-dancer-claims-of-torture-and-death-in-custody-under-myanmars-military-rule-12397750>> accessed 23 October 2025.
105. BBC News 2021, *supra* n 105; UN Doc A/HRC/57/56, *supra* n 71.
106. UN Doc A/HRC/56/CRP.8, *supra* n 11 at ¶ 71.
107. 10-012.
108. LI7; 10-065.
109. 10-012.
110. *Ibid.* Sources indicate that the extrajudicial execution was perpetrated by four resistance soldiers under the command of an NUG-linked local defense team in Chuang-U Township, Sagaing Region. A statement issued by the NUG in 2023 acknowledged that the victims were "unlawfully killed" and indicated ministries would take legal action, but did not mention the alleged sexual violence. National Unity Government, 'Joint Statement on action taken against illegal acts of some members of the Village People's Defence Force Chuang Oo Township, Sagaing Division,' (4 May 2023) Joint Statement No (1/2023) <https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibraryorg/files/obl/2023-05-04-NUG_Joint_Statement-No.1-tu-en.pdf> accessed 10 July 2025.
111. 10-012; see also 10-019.
112. LI6; LI8.
113. 10-012.
114. LI6; LI8.
115. LI8.
116. 10-019; 10-012.
117. 10-019.
118. LI10.
119. 10-019.
120. LI8.
121. LI9.
122. LI6.
123. In February 2024, the SAC began enforcing the People's Military Service Law (a 2010 law which had previously not been enforced) mandating military service for men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27. Conscript exemptions exist for married women, which has further increased the risk of early or forced marriages for women and girls. The Global New Light of Myanmar, 'People's Military Service System supposed as Mandatory Military Service System' (26 February 2024) <<https://www.gnlm.com.mm/peoples-military-service-system-supposed-as-mandatory-military-service-system/>> accessed 11 August 2025; UN Doc A/HRC/56/CRP.8, *supra* n 11 at ¶¶ 70, 153; People's Military Service Law စကြာမင်းစောနှင့် ဦးစင်၏ ဝပြည့်သည့်စစ်ရေးအစီအစဉ် (State Peace and Development Council Law No. 27/ 2010) 4 November 2010.
124. LI8; 10-035; 10-036; 10-037; 10-012.
125. 10-018.
126. 10-012.
127. *Ibid.*
128. LI8.
129. Data recorded by Myanmar Peace Monitor between 1 February 2021 to 23 September 2025 indicates a total of 4,194,047 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Myanmar. Myanmar Peace Monitor, 'Situation of Internally Displaced Persons in Myanmar' [on-going dashboard] (23 September 2025) <<https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/on-going-dashboard/internally-displaced-persons-situation-in-myanmar-jan-2021-aug-2022/>> accessed 25 September 2025.
130. LI8; LI11.
131. LI10.
132. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Module on Prevention and Response to Conflict Related Sexual Violence' (2017) 5 <https://resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net/training-files/Training%20Materials/027%20STM-CRSV/027-013%20CRSV.Strategic_Module.pdf> accessed 7 August 2025 (*hereinafter* UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2017).
133. *Ibid.*
134. 10-019.
135. LI; LI6; LI10.
136. LI6.
137. LI7.
138. 10-012.
139. LI1; LI6; LI7; LI10.
140. LI1; LI6; LI7; LI9.
141. LI8.
142. LI6.
143. *Ibid.*
144. 10-019.
145. LI8.
146. LI7; LI8.
147. LI6; LI7; LI10; LI12.
148. LI6.
149. LI7.
150. LI10.
151. 10-002.
152. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Policy on Gender-Based Crimes: Crimes involving sexual, reproductive and other gender-based violence' (December 2023) <<https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2023-12/2023-policy-gender-en-web.pdf>> accessed 21 October 2025.

153. See UN Doc A/HRC/57/18, *supra* n 33 at ¶¶ 19, 25.
154. Rome Statute Art. 7(1), (2); Elements of Crimes Art. 7, Introduction; see also Global Rights Compliance, 'Basic Investigative Standards for International Crimes,' (August 2019) 180-187 <<https://globalrightscpliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Basic-Investigative-Standards-for-International-Crimes-Hardcopy.pdf>> accessed 13 August 2025.
155. Rome Statute, Art. 7(2)(a).
156. *Prosecutor v Ntaganda* (Appeal Judgment) ICC-01/04-02/06 (30 March 2021) ¶ 673.
157. 10-041.
158. 10-042; 10-017.
159. 10-041.
160. Rome Statute art. 7(1)(f).
161. Rome Statute art. 7(1)(g); Elements of Crimes arts 7(1)(g)-1, (g)-6.
162. Rome Statute art 7(2)(a); *Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo* (Judgment) ICC-01/05-01/08 (21 March 2016) ¶ 150 (overruled on other grounds) (*Bemba*).
163. *Prosecutor v Gbagbo* (Pre-Trial) ICC-02/11-01/11 (12 June 2014) ¶ 212.
164. *Ntaganda* Appeal Judgment (n 156) ¶ 424.
165. *Prosecutor v Katanga* (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 March 2014) ¶ 1104; 10-016.
166. UN Doc A/HRC/57/18, *supra* n 33 at ¶ 29; see also *Bemba* Trial Judgment (n 162) ¶ 691.
167. Rome Statute Art. 7(1)(f); Elements of Crimes arts. 7(1)(f)-1, 2; see also AAPP 2024, *supra* n 81.
168. Rome Statute Art. 7(1)(f); Elements of Crimes arts. 7(1)(f)-3.
169. 10-030.
170. 10-016; 10-017.
171. *Katanga* Judgment (n 165) ¶ 1123.
172. *Ibid.*
173. *Ibid.* See also *Prosecutor v Ntaganda* (Pre-Trial Decision) ICC-01/04-02/06 (9 June 2014) ¶ 24 (holding that attacks were "systematic" where they "followed a recurrent *modus operandi*."). The ICC Trial Chamber in the Ongwen case considered the "coordinated and methodical effort[s]" of the perpetrators, such as the direct orders to target civilians, as evidence of a systematic attack. *Prosecutor v Ongwen* (Judgment) ICC-02/04-01/15 (4 February 2020) ¶¶ 212-213, 2803. In the Kenyatta case, the Trial Chamber focused on the ferrying of attackers in trucks from other locations for the purpose of the attack as evidence of the attack's "systematic" nature. Muthaura et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Pre-Trial), ¶ 158; *ibid.* ¶¶ 160-161, 148, 150 (evidence on the ferrying).
174. UNHRC, 'Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar' (12 July 2022) UN Doc A/HRC/51/4 ¶ 7; UNHRC, 'Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar' (30 June 2023) UN Doc A/HRC/54/1198 ¶¶ 3, 23; UNHRC, 'Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar' (5 July 2021) UN Doc A/HRC/48/18 ¶¶ 33-34, *Katanga* Judgment (n 165) ¶ 1123.
175. Rome Statute art 8(2)(b); Elements of Crimes arts 8(2)(b)(xxii)-(1-6), 8(2)(e)(v. i)-(1-6).
176. See *Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi* (Judgment) ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016) ¶¶ 11, 32-33, 36-37, 63 (convicting the leader of a non-State organisation of the war crime of attacking protected objects in his capacity as a leader of an Ansar Dine-AQIM offshoot militant group during a NIAC); see also *Prosecutor v Rutaganda* (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-96-3-A (26 May 2003) ¶¶ 557, 562-563, 584 (overturning the ICTR Trial Chamber's acquittal and finding a former Interahamwe leader guilty of two counts of the war crime of murder based on sufficient nexus between the killings and the NIAC given the accused's position of authority in the Interahamwe).
177. FIDH, 'Majidi Nema's conviction for war crimes committed in Syria is a landmark decision for universal jurisdiction' [press release] (13 June 2025) <<https://www.fidh.org/en/region/north-africa-middle-east/syria/majidi-nema-s-conviction-for-war-crimes-committed-in-syria-is-a>> accessed 9 July 2025.
178. Doughty Street Chambers, 'German Federal Court of Justice confirms the first-ever conviction of an ISIS member for genocide' [press release] (26 January 2023) <<https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/german-federal-court-justice-confirms-first-ever-conviction-isis-member-genocide>> accessed 9 July 2025; Doughty Street Chambers, 'ISIS member convicted of crimes against humanity for aiding and abetting enslavement of a Yazidi woman' [press release] (23 April 2021) <<https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/isis-member-convicted-crimes-against-humanity-aiding-and-abetting-enslavement-yazidi-woman>> accessed 9 July 2025.
179. *Ahmad al K.* (Judgment) Hague District Court 09/748001-18 (16 July 2021).
180. Stockholms tingsrätt, 'Conviction in a case concerning genocide, crimes against humanity and gross war crimes' [press release] (11 February 2025) <<https://www.domstol.se/stockholms-tingsratt/nyheter/2025/02/conviction-in-a-case-concerning-genocide-crimes-against-humanity-and-gross-war-crimes/>> accessed 9 July 2025.
181. Rome Statute, Art. 8, 2(b) xxii.
182. Myanmar Penal Code 1861 (as amended in 2016), Section 375.
183. *Ibid.*
184. *Ibid.*
185. Defence Services Act 1959, Section 72.
186. Myanmar Penal Code, Sections 319 and 320.
187. ICC, 'ICC judges authorise opening of an investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar' [press release] (19 November 2019) <<https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-judges-authorise-opening-investigation-situation-bangladesh/myanmar>> accessed 21 November 2025.
188. REDRESS and Global Survivors Fund (GSF) 2023, *supra* n 18.
189. NUG Myanmar, 'The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Accepts the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court' (20 August 2021) <<https://twitter.com/NUGMyanmar/status/1428739347717648389>> accessed 4 August 2025.
190. Fortify Rights, 'Myanmar's Civilian Government Delegates Jurisdiction to International Criminal Court' (20 August 2021) <https://www.fortifyrights.org/our_impact/imp-mya-2021-08-19/> accessed 4 August 2025; Antonia Mulvey, 'Symposium on the Current Crisis in Myanmar: New Communication to the International Criminal Court Calls for Justice for Victims and Survivors of Crimes Committed by Myanmar's Military over Past Two Decades' (*Opinio Juris*, 21 September 2021) <<https://opiniojuris.org/2021/09/29/symposium-on-the-current-crisis-in-myanmar-new-communication-to-the-international-criminal-court-calls-for-justice-for-victims-and-survivors-of-crimes-committed-by-myanmars-military-over-pas/>> accessed 4 August 2025.
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195. International Court of Justice (ICJ), 'The Republic of Gambia institutes proceedings against the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and asks the Court to indicate provisional measures' [press release] (11 November 2019) <<https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf>> accessed 28 July 2025.
196. See also Legal Action Worldwide 2023, *supra* n 27 at 59-65 (detailing findings that the Myanmar military's perpetration of SGBV against the Rohingya during the 2017 'clearance operations' amounted to acts of genocide).
197. The principle of Universal Jurisdiction is founded on the belief that such crimes, such as crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, are so heinous as to concern humanity as a whole. In such cases, a State may exercise jurisdiction over an individual implicated in such crimes, regardless of where the crime is committed or the nationality of the alleged victims and/or perpetrators. To do, States must have adopted national legislation recognising relevant crimes and authorising their prosecution. See Global Justice Center, 'Update: The Universal Jurisdiction Case Against Myanmar Officials' (14 February 2025) <<https://www.globaljusticecenter.net/update-the-universal-jurisdiction-case-against-myanmar-officials/>> accessed 4 August 2025.
198. Fortify Rights, 'Criminal Complaint Filed in Germany against Myanmar Generals for Atrocity Crimes' (24 January 2023) <<https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-inv-2023-01-24/>> accessed 28 July 2025; Myanmar Accountability Project (MAP), 'War Crimes Case Against Myanmar Junta Brought in the Philippines' (25 October 2023) <<https://the-world-is-watching.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/PH-PR-v1.pdf>> accessed 28 July 2025; Channel News Asia, 'Myanmar military junta formally accused of alleged war crimes before Philippines' justice department' (26 October 2023) <<https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/philippines-myanmar-junta-coup-war-crimes-criminal-complaint-thantlang-3875591>> accessed 4 August 2025; MAP, 'Turkish Authorities Open Unprecedented Investigation into Myanmar Junta' (2 June 2022) <<https://the-world-is-watching.org/2022/06/02/turkish-authorities-open-unprecedented-investigation-into-myanmar-junta/>> accessed 4 August 2025.
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200. REDRESS and Global Survivors Fund (GSF) 2023, *supra* n 18.
201. *Ibid.*
202. *Ibid.*
203. *Ibid.*
204. *Ibid.*
205. *Ibid.*
206. 10-035.
207. *Ibid.*
208. *Ibid.*
209. *Ibid.*

210. UN Doc A/HRC/RES/59/2, *supra* n 15; Legal Action Worldwide, 'Roundtable Summary: Paving the way for accountability, truth, and reconciliation: a trust fund for victims of atrocity crimes in Myanmar' (21 October 2024) <<https://legalactionworldwide.org/accountability-rule-of-law/paving-the-way-for-accountability-truth-and-reconciliation-a-trust-fund-for-victims-of-atrocity-crimes-in-myanmar/>> accessed 7 October 2025.
211. Source: Security Force Monitor, an expert military analyst of the Myanmar military and associated forces. See <<https://securityforcemonitor.org/>> and <https://myanmar.securityforces.info/>.
212. *Ibid.*



-  Rue de Varembe 3, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland
-  info@legalactionworldwide.org
-  www.legalactionworldwide.org/
-  <https://x.com/LegalActionWW>
-  <https://www.facebook.com/LegalActionWorldwide/>
-  Legal Action Worldwide (@legalactionworldwide)